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ThSs was a field study involving two groups of airline
pilots over a two-year period to determine what factors affected
their transition from traditional airline cockpits to a highly
automated version. All were highly experienced in traditiunal
models of the McDonnell-Douglas DC-9 (-10, -30 and -50 models)
prior to their transition to the more automated DC-9-qO (MD-80).
Results and conclusions dealt with specific features of the
new aircraft, particularly the digital flight guidance system
(DFGS) and other automatic features such as the autothrottle
system (ATS), autobrake, and digital displays. Particular
attention was paid to the first 200 hours of line flylng
experience in the new aircraft, and the difficulties that some
pilots found in adapting to the new systems durlng this initial
operating period. The lack of a DC-9-80 simulator at the
beginning of the study, and its subsequent availability to pilots
who transitioned later in the study was a salient feature of the
project. Other findln_involved efforts to prevent skill loss
from automation, training methods, traditional human factors
issues, and general views of the pilots toward cockpit automation.
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SUMMARY
This was a field study involving two groups of airline
pilots over a two-year period to determine what factors affected
their transition from traditional airline cockpits to a hig_,ly
automated version. All were highly experienced in traditional
models of the McDonnell-Douglas DC-9 (-I0, -30 and -50 models)
prior to their transition to the more automated DC-9-80 (MD-80).
Results and conclusions dealt with specific features of the
new aircraft, particularly the digital flight guidance system
(DFGS) and other automatic features such as the autothrottle
system (ATS), autobrake, and digital displays. Particular
attention was paid to the first 200 hours of llne flying
experience in the new aircraft, and the difficulties that some
pilots found in adapting to the new systems during this initial
operating period. The lack of a DC-9-80 slmulator at the
beginning of the study, and its subsequent availability to pilots
who transitioned later in the study was a salient feature of the
project. Other findin_involved efforts t,_ prevent skill loss
from automation, training methods, _raditional human factors
issues, and general views of the pilots toward cockpit automation.
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I. INT?,ODUCTION
The microprocessor revolution of the 1970's offered
commercial aircraft and avionics manufacturers the opportunity tO
design and implement small, special purpose digital computers for
the flightdeck, these computers made it possible to automate
many of the functions previously performed manually by the
flightcrew, and as well to provide the logic for warning and
alerting systems that, in effect, worked in parallel with the
pilot. In addition, flight instruments driven Dy digital
computers allowed the designer to display digitally information
which previously had been present analogically, mostly on
pointer-type instruments.
Thus, the new generation of automated, microprocessor-based
transport aircraft went far beyond previous generation of
automatic equipment, such as autopilots, flight directors, and
altitude alerters. The potertial has only begun to be exploited.
For example, the potential fuel savings of 4-D navigation and
microwave landing systems (MLS) is now being addressed, partly
because the airborne equipment has not yet been perfected, but
mainly because the ATC system does not yet alloy full
exploitation of flight-deck automation.
By the end of the 1970's, many in the aviation field, and in
government, were beginning to be concerned about certain safety
implications of the march toward automation. There was evidence
from aviation accidents and incidents, as well as words of
caution from members of the human factors profession (Edwards,
1977), that human error could not be automated out of the system,
and indeed, design and installation of automatic devices in the
cockpit, without proper human factors principles, could increase
rather than decrease, the potential for human error. Questions
were also being raised about whethe: automation would necessarily
reduce crew workload.
In 1977 a House of Representatives subcommittee gathered
opinions from various segments of the aviation industry on their
areas of concern for commercial flight safety (Anon, 1977). One
of the areas that stood nut was automation. These concerns were
voiced again in a Senate subcommittee (Anon, 1980). As a resul_
of these hearings, and othe_ concerns about the safety impact o:
automation, in 1979 NASA was directed to examine the human
factors of automation. An automation group was formed at tne
NASA-Ames Research Center, under the 0irection of Dr. Renwick
Curry. Dr. Curry and t_e author, then on leave from the
University of Miami, published a paper (Wiener and Curry, 1980)
in which they outlined the benefits and potential problems of
automation on the flightdeck, and drafted 15 tentative pLinciples
(previously called "guidelines"), which are reprinted in Appendlx
1 o£ this report.
In order to seek further information and opinion on the
potential human factors problems of automation, NASA held a 3oint
industry-NASA workshop on flightdeck automation in the summer of
1980. A small group of experts from industry, government,
airlines, academic institutions, and NASA examined the issues and
drafted a report which generated questions that would require
research in the years to come (Boehm-Davis, Curry, Wiener, and
Harrison, 1981).
In this report, no effort has been made to provide a
comprehensive review of the literature and state-of-the-art of
cockpit automation. This can be found in the papers by Wieper
and Curry (1980) and Wiener (1985).
_ nf _he _
The purpose of this research was to gain information on the
human factors of automated cockpits. The particular issue under
study was the transition of pilots from a traditional technology
aircraft (DC-9-10, -30 and -50) to a highly automated derivative
model. The DC-9-SO is used here as a nlaboratory" to study crew
transition. The study is not intended as a critique of the DC-9-
80 design per se. However, in collecting questionnaire and
interview data, it was inevitable that the crews would discuss in
minute detail the particular systems of this aircraft. It is
impossible to conduct an "aircraft independent" project of this
sort. The author feels that most of the comments regarding DC-9-
80 systems can be interpreted as generic statements regarding
flightdeck automation.
Also, the results of this study may not be entirely "airline
independent', as they are the product of one airline's experience
in adapting to a new technology aircraft. It is inevitable that
there will be problems as well as successes in integrating a new
aircraft, particularly one employing a new technology, into an
airline's fleet. The problems, as reflected in some of the
negative comments made during interviews (see Section VI), should
not be construed as criticism of either the host airline or the
manufacturer. Two points should be made regarding some of the
comments in the interview section:
1) Most of the training problems mentioned by the check
airmen and line pilots were the consequence of not
having a DC-9-80 simulator availaDJe. This was remedied
later in the study period, and a much more positive view
of both the training and the aircraft emerged in the
second phase of data collection as a result of this.
2) As the pilots became more experienced in the -80, most
of the negative sentiments vanished.
II. BACKGROUND TO PRESENT STUDY
Choice of
NASA scientists felt that many of the questions posed by
the workshop could best be answered by field investigations with
air carriers, rather than laboratory work. In 1980 the
introduction of the McDonnell-Douglas DC-9-80 (Super 80)
presented a golden opportunity for such a field investigation.
(In 1983 Douglas redesignated the airc.aft the MD-80. For
the sake of consistency, this report will use the traditional
designation). The Super 80 was designed for the short and medium
haul market, and would bring to the carriers serving these
markets an aircraft with electronic and avionic sophistication
previously seen only a widebody transports. The intended market,
consisting mainly of regional carriers, made the -80 especially
attractive as a study vehicle, since it would be flown primarily
by flight crews transitioning from older, less automated aircraft
such as Boeing 737s and 727s, and older models of the DC-9. For
this reason we would have the opportunity to study the reactions
of pilots who were flying sophisticated avionics for the first
time (excluding possibly militar_ experience). This was in
contrast with the larger trunk carriers, where many flightcrew
members, especially very senior first officers and very junior
captains, might have had right-seat experience in sophisticated
widebody aircraft.
At a meeting of the Operations Forum of the &Jr Transport
Association (ATA) in 1980, Dr. Alan Chambers revealed the desire
of his division to work with a carrier planning to buy the DC-9-
80. Capt. John Hanson, then Director of Flight Standards and
Training at Republic Airlines, expressed an interest, and shortly
after Curry and Wiener made a formal proposal for a cooperative
study to Republic's flight operations management and the
Republic/ALPA Safety Committee. In April 1981 the author
attended a three-week pilot training course on the Super 8G at
Douglas Aircraft in Long Beach, and the work with Republic began
in early 1982.
In order to understand the great value of the Super _0 for
this study, it is necessary to discuss briefly the design
philosophy of the plane, and its place in the crew complement
("two vs. three man") issue. With the introduction of digital
systems into the cockpit, the question of crew workload, and
hence crew size, was emerging as an issue Detween manufacturers,
_ carriers, and pilot unions in the U.S. and worldwide. Both
a ame and avionics manufacturers were stressing the promise of
au _ation in achieving workload reduction, and it became clear
?iil
that their intention was to request certification for aircraft
with two-pilot crews. An article on the Super 80 avionic system
appearing in _KEj_ ]_ and _4_ _ (Smith, 1978)
well before the appearance of the Super 80, was entitled,
UDigital system used to cut workload, u Douglas, as well as
Sperry, the designer of _he digital flight guidance system
(DFGS), based their design philosophy on workload reduction
through automation. This was due to concern for the safety of
aircraft operated by regional carriers, which by the nature of
their operations, typically spent a large portion of each leg in
climb and descent in high-density terminal areas. The collision
of a PSA Boeing 727 with a Cessna 172 over San Diego in 1978
intensified the desire to reduce cockpit workload, allowing more
time for extra-cockpit scanning. But clearly the manufacturers
and potential customers also sought to head off any argument that
the Super 80 should carry a thlrd pilot, the posi:ion adopted by
the Ai_ L_ne Pilots Association (ALPA), though not all of it3
indiviaual executive councils. The purpose in mentioning this is
to stress the emphasis on workload reduction in the design phase.
A more thorough discussion of workload and the crew complement
question can be found in Wiener (1985).
The issue was eventually settled by tb_ President's Task
Force on Crew Complement (McLucus et el., 1981) and the FAA's
certification of the -80 as a two-pilot aircraft. The
Presidential Task Force based its decision largely on the
demonstrated safety record of two-pilot aircraft, and the
assumption that workload was not likely to increase in future
models. The assumption that the flightcrew's workload is reduced
in any aircraft by introducing autemation was challenged by
Wiener and Curry's report (1980), in which they argue that
workload may not be reduced at all, but merely relocated in time
(for example, programming at the gate, rather than in flight).
Likewise, the nature of the workload may be changed, as for
example, reducing manual operations, but increasing the aeed to
monitor the equipment. This viewpoint was expressed recently by
the National Transportation Safety Board in its recommendations
following a DC-10 overshoot accident at Ke-nedy Airport (NTSB,
1984). The author begins with the positio., that it should never
be assumed the automation reduces total workload. This is one of
the primary questlons to be addressed by the present study.
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III • STUDY METHODOLOGY
Since this study focussed on the adaptation of flightcrews
to the more highly automated environment of the -80, most of the
data were collected directly from crew members -- including line
crews and check captains. The following sources of data were
originally proposed=
a. cockpit observations
b. structured interviews with crews
c. questionnaires filled out by crews
d. interviews with check captains
e. interviews with simulator instructors
_. maintenance logs
g. check pilot meetings
Of these proposed sources of information, only the first
four were examined extensively, for the following reasons. Since
Republic's -80 simulator was not installed until May 1983,
interviews with simulator instructors were not pursued.
Maintenance logs did not prove to be a valuable source of
information. A sample maintenance log (ATA Chapter 22 items) of
one aircraft (No. 301) was examined and was deemed not to have
potential for this study. Minutes of check pilot meetings were
useful principally for formulating questions to be asked in
interviews with check captains.
Longitudinal /_
Early in the project it was decided to design what is known
as a "longitudinal analysis." This study method involves forming
a study group, usually referred to as a "panel," and collecting
data from them over several points in time. The value of a
longitudinal study is that it permits the investigation of
changes within individuals, rather than comparing groups of
different individuals at points in time (called a "cross-
sectional analysis"). In this research, intra-individual
differences seemed important -- we were interested in how one's
approach to and adaptation to cockpit automation changed over
experience (and hence time). By starting early, we would be able
to collect our first sample of data (called a "wave" in
longitudinal analysis) early in the pilot's experience with the -
60.
The disadvantages of a longitudinal analysis should also be
mentioned. Longitudinal studies tend to be expensive; they
require a panel who will remain with the study through its
several waves; and in spite of dedication, some panel members are
inevitably lost over the length of the study for a variety of
reasons, incluo_ng illness, retirement, or reassignment. In
addition, there are inevitable gaps in the data, due to some
panel members, for one reason or another, failing to fill out
questionnaires or not being available for interview, yet
remaining in the panel for future waves. Also, continuing
support from the host organizations is mandatory. And finally
longitudinal methods require a continuity of the investigative
staff, especially when field observations and face-to-face
interviews are required, and hence standardization is essential.
Pane_ Ee_m_Zino
Pilot volunteers were contacted by a direct mailing from
the Republ_c Central Air Safety Committee of the Air Line Pilots
Association (ALPA), which acted as a go-between, linking the
pilots with the _nvestigators throughout the study. A booklet
explaining the purpose of the study and carrying a cover letter
bearing the endorsement of the management and the union, went out
to the original group o_ pilots (approximately I00) who had
re:eived -80 training. Unfortunately, due to post-Deregulation
economic conditions, the company drastically cut its order of -
80s, receiving only three initially in 1981, and three more in
December 1982. Consequently, many _f the original trainees had
not flown the line in the -80 at the _ime of the first appeal for
volunteers, and many ot the remaining trcinees flew only a
minimal number of trips in the -80. Thus the origlnal appeal
yielded only 30 volunteers, and some of these _ever flew the -80
in line operations.
In the summer of 1982, and later in December of I_82 and
January 1983, more pilots entered differences training, a,:4 eight
of these joined the panel, but not in time for the first wavc of
questionnaires, which went out in June 1982. Those who joined
subsequent to that time received their first series of
questionnaires at the same time that the original panel received
their second, in June 1983. The mean flying time in the -80 of
those responding to the first wave was 365 hours, with a mean
total flying time of over 15,000 hours. The standard deviation
of -80 time was 290 hours, indicating a g6eat variation around
the mean. The minimum was 37 hours, and the maximum was 1180
hours. Thus it can be seen that the mean experience level in the
-_0 was the equivalent of less than one-half year of full time
line flying. See Table 2-B for the Wave Two flying time data.
In 1983 Republic decided to move approximately half of its
Super 80 blocks to the Las Vegas domicile. This further reduced
the number of Minneapolis pilots in the study panel who were
actively flying the -80, but created an opportunity to form a new
panel. With the approval and assistance of Republic's western
Safety Committee, a panel of 13 volunteers based in Las Vegas was
formed in the fail of 1983, and soon after first wave
questionnaires wer_ ma_led out. Since Republic's simulator was
not installed until May 1983, the first Las Vegas crews went
threugh the difference_ program (training program for already
6
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qualified DC-9 crews, stressing only the different or new
features of the DC-9-80), but shortly after this the new Las
Vegas crews wen_ through the simulator-based program. Thus the
Lau Vegas study panel was composed of crews from both training
programs. The role of the simulator in early line experience is
discussed at length in this report.
Confidentiality
Confidentiality was ensured by having each pilot assign
himself an eight letter/digit code when he initially 3oined the
panel. Those codes were placeO on all questionnaires by the
respondents, but only the union Safety Committee had the code-to-
name legend, and it was never seen by the author. It has since
been destroyed. In the face-to-face interviews, the author knew
the name of the pilot he was interviewing (it would be
impractical to do otherwise), but did not know his code ID, and
did not record his name on the interview form. In ]umpseat
observations, no record was kept of flight n_mbers, dates, or
crew menders' names.
_gestionnaire _
Three areas to be probed in soliciting aircrew opinions and
practices were determined from the following sources: initial
interviews with management pilots, jumpseat observations in older
models of the DC-9, jumpseat observations in -80's of another
carrier, and conversations with the crews, the experiences gained
in attending the DC-9-80 school in Long Beach, and the questions
generated at the NASA Industry Workshop. The three areas were:
1) attitudes toward automation in general, and the DC-9-80
cockpit J n particular; 2) frequency of use of those automatic
devices whose use was a matter of pilot _ption; and 3) pilot
perception of workload and fatigue.
Numerous forms for the attitude scales were considered.
Knowing pilots' disdain for paperwork, and mindful of our promise
in the if,citation to 3oin the panel that participation would
require only four to five hours a year, we sought to design forms
that would be simple in format and would not require over one
hour to complete. The final forms consisted of two instruments,
a 3S-item Likert-type attitude scale, and a 5-by-16 matrlx
frequency of use chart (see Figures 1 and 2). The Likert scale
is an int_msity type of attitude measurement, in which a
statement is presenteG, and =he respondent replies along a
continuous scale from strong disagreement to strong agreement
with the statement. The statements can be positive or negatlve
toward the sub]ect at hand- The advantages of the Likert scale
is that it is easy for the respondent, allows a wide range of
_esponse (some forms use a multipie-choice restricted response),
and Is easy to score. The statements themselves were designed to
probe several general (though sol_ewhat overlapping) ar_as:
I• General attitude toward automation
2. G_n¢,al attitude toward flying as a profession
• Specific attitude toward certain features of the -80,
and specific items
. General attitudes toward the influence of equipment on
safety and economy
. Influence of automation on workload, fatigue, and time
to perform tasks, including extra-cockpit scanning
The 36 items are listed in Table 1. The frequency-of-use
scale simply asks the crew member to indicate the frequency, in
terms cf percentages, of his use of 16 pieces of equipment.
Frequency of use was considered crucial to the study for several
reasons• First, the NASA-Industry Workshop participants had
raised several questions regarding possible overuse and underuse
of automatic options (Boehm-Davis, et al., 1981). Secondly,
frequency of use is a va1:iable that may show considerable change
in a longitudinal study. We expected frequency of use of
automatic features to increase over time, particularly between
the first and second wave of data collection. Finally, it is the
general policy of Republic management that automatic devices
should be used (subject to captain's discretion, of course).
Pilots referred to this policy as "we bought it, you use it w, and
this is discussed in lat,_r sections. Since the Republic -80
pilots all had considerable experience with earlier models of the
DC-9, this scale, with this panel provided a particularly good
opportunity' to determine patterns of usage of equipment that they
were encountering for the first time. There were problems in the
interpretation of the instructions, which led to some
questionable data on t_is form. This is discussed in Section IV.
A structured interview form was developed for use with the
line pilots, and was tested in interviews with management pilots.
A structured interview is a compromise between a questionnaire
(completely structured) and a totally unstructured interview. It
imposes structure to the extent of making certain that all topics
are covered, but allows the freedom of an unstructured interview
to follow up points, seek clarification, and in general use
interviewer judgement about pursuing points further, or ending
discussion if need be. In the interviews with the panel, many
valuable points were raised by the interviewees that would n_t
have been revealed in a questionnaire or rigid interview.
The interviews with the chec. captains covered all of the
points covered in the line pilot interviews, but also included
i0.
Table I
The 36 Likert scale items
i. Flying today is more challenging than ever.
2. I miss the "good old days m of simpler aircraft.
3. I am concerned about a possible loss of my flying skills
with too much automation.
4. I hand fly part of every trip to keep my skills up.
5. Hand flying is the part of the trip I enjoy the _ost.
6. I think they've gone too far with automation.
7. I can fly the airplane as smoothly and safely by hand as
with automation.
8. It is important te me to fly the most modern plane in the
company's fleet.
9. I look favorably on automation in the cockpit - the more the
better.
I am looking forward to even more automation in future
planes.
ii. I wish we had full autothrottles on the 10s, 30s and 50s.
12. Younger pilots catch on to automation faster than older
ones,
13. Pilots who overuse automation wii see their flying skills
suffer.
14. AutomatioD frees me of much of the routine, mechanical parts
of flying so I can concentrate more on "managing N the
flight.
15. I spend more time setting up and managing the automatics
(such as the DFG$) than I would hand flying or using the
old style autopilots.
16. Older pilots seem to resist the new technologies.
17. Automation does not reduce workload, since ther_ is more to
keep watch over.
18. Automation is the thing that is going to turn this industry
around and make it profitable again.
19.
20.
21.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
Automation may be helpful in long-haul operations, but not
in short-segment operations like ours.
All these new features are nice to have, but they're not
worth the money.
I use automatic devices a lot just because I find them
useful.
Autoland capability woulu definitely enhance safety.
I use automatic devices mainly because the companh' wants me
to.
Cat II and Cat Ill operations would mean very little to our
company.
I have serious concerns about the reliability of this new
equipment.
I am worried about sudden failures of the new digital
devices like the DFGS and the ARTS.
Automation reduces overall workload.
The new equipment is more reliable than the old.
Too much automation can be dangerous.
Overall, automation reduces pilot fatigue.
I think that the -80 is a significant step forward in short
and medium haul aircraft.
The -80 is just another DC-9 with some new toys.
The ARTS feature of the -80 is a real plus for safety on
takeoff.
Flying the -80 is definitely easier than flying the older
models.
I en]oy flying the -80 more than the older DC-gs.
I like to use the new features of the -80 as much as
possible.
i0
t'l".l
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questions regarding their experiences as instructor pilots on the
-80. Of particular interest were questions dealing with their
perceptions of problems encountered by students during training,
and during their Initial Operating Experience (IOE) on the line.
It turned out that the interviews were even less structured
than the a,_thor intended. He quickly discovered that it was
difficult to keep the pilots from jumping from one subject to
another. So the order of the questions were abandoned, and the
only structure imposed was to make certain that all topics were
covered, regardless of order. It is probably safe to say that
the inability of the interviewer to keep the discussions running
in a structured order could be taken as a measure _f the
enthusiasm that the pilots had for the project. Most came in
showing advanced preparation for the interview, with an "agenda"
of things they wanted to say about the automatic features and the
cockpit design. Some arrived with a written list of items that
they wished to cover, and several times, pilots who were not part
of the study panel arrived and asked to be interviewed.
The Likert scales were scored by constructing a ruler which
measured the position of the "X" mark in terms of its distance
from the leftmost (strongest disagreement) point on the scale.
The position of the "X" was scored from 01 (strongest
disagreement) to 99 (strongest agreement). Scores close to 50
indicate mid-scale ('neither agree nor disagree') responses.
Thus, for each pilot, there were 36 Likert scale scores ranging
from 01 to 99, and on the same form, three questions regarding
flying experience: total flying time, total time in the -80, and
the number of days (at the time of filling out the forms) since
last flying the -80. The results are su_narized in Tables 2-A
and 2-B in the next section.
The percent-use scale data was recorded in terms of
percentages, from 0 to 100. Pilots were instructed to place an
"X N in any cell where the equipment was not usable or its use
invalid (e.g. autobrake at cruise), to distinguish that condition
from legitimate responses of zero use. Questionnaires were
returned by mail.
The data were entered by keyboard into an Apple II
computer, using a commercially available database management
package, DB Master, which created a file for each questionnaire
form. Fo_ statistical analysis, the data were ported via
telephone modem from the database in the Apple to the University
of Miami's Univac 1108 mainframe. A more detailed writeup of the
data management system can be found in Appendix 2.
my
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Figure i
DC-9-80 attitude questionnaire
i. Flying today is more challenging than ever.
1 ...... 1 ....... 1 ....... 1 ---i
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Strongly
Disagree agree nor Agree
disagree
2. I miss the "geod old days" of simpler aircraft.
1 ...... 1 ...... 1 ........ 1..... 1
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Strongly
Disagree agree nor Agree
disagree
o
I am concerned about a possible loss of my flying skills with
too much automation.
i ........ 1 ...... 1 ...... 1 ....... 1
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Strongly
Disagree agree nor Agree
disagree
4. I hand fly part of every trip to keep my skills up.
1 ...... 1 ......... 1 ---I 1
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Strongly
Disagree agree nor Agree
disagree
5. Hand flying is the part of the trip that I enjoy the most.
1 1 -i ...... 1......... 1
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Strongly
Disagree agree nor Agree
disagree
6. I think they've gone too f_r with automation.
1 ..... 1........ i-'- 1..... 1
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Strongly
Disagree agree nor Agree
disagree
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IV. QUESTIONNAXRE RESULTS
The Likert attitude scale statistics are summarized in
Tables 2-A and 2-B. The samples sizes were 37 in Wave One and 20
in Wave Two, on some scales the samples si2es were less, due to
missing data in the questionnaire forms. Appendix 4-A and 4-B
contain in computer printout form the entire intercorrelation
matrix for the 36 attitude items and the three flying time items
(total of 39 points per pilot).
Since 36 attitude scales are more than a reader can digest,
we have sorte_ the items by content into groupings, which are
listed in Table 3 and displayed in Figures 3-A through 3-F. Note
that this grouping was based on subjective judgements on the part
of the author -- it does not represent the zesults of statistical
clustering techniques such as factor analysis. There were too
few data to use such methods, as they require that there be more
respondents than items. The six groupings, subjective as they
may be, make it easier to read and discuss the data. Figures I-A
through I-F depict in graphic form the mean of the responses to
the attitude questions plus and minus one standard deviation •
The striking feature of these data is the great diversity in
attitudes, as seen both by the large standard deviations (about
15 to 20 points in most cases) as well as the ranges. On most
items the range of opinions run full-scale -- from total
disag:eement (01) to total agreement (99). It is not usual for
pilots to have diverse opinio:_s about their jobs and equipment,
but the magnitude of disagreement was somewhat larger than
expected. Extremes of opinion will appear again in the face-to-
f_ce interviews to discussed in the next two sections.
Frequency-of-Use
The data from =he frequency-of-use form are summarized in
Table 4-A and 4-B. Note that the sample size varies considerably
throughout the -80 cells in this table, due to the fact that it
was up to the respondent to decide whether or not the equipment
feature was appropriate for the phases ef flight.
-D_eul=eu_M_ _
Five open-ended questions were included at the beginning of
the questionnaire package. Responses to these are summarized in
Tables 5-1 to 5-5.
14
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Respondenta were encouraged to write in any co:nments they
wished to make, not necessarily in response to an] particular
question, and several did so. These are summarized in Table 6.
15
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Table 2-A
Summary statistics on flying experience data and attitude
scale responses. Refer to Table I for full text of
Likert statements.
HAEE ONE
Item N Mean S_D. Min Max
total time
time in -80
days since -80 flt
i. challenging
2. good old days
3. loss of skills
4. hand fly
5. enjoy hand fly
6. too far w/ auto
7. hand vs. auto
8. mod important
9. more automation
I0. future auto
Ii. autothrottles
12. young vs. old
13. overuse of auto
14. manage flight
15. time problems
16. old resist
17. more to watch
18. auto profit
19. auto not help
20. not worth $
21. auto is useful
22. autoland
23. company wants
24. cat II &III
25. reliability
26. sudden failures
27. less workload
28. new = reliable
29. too much auto
30. reduce fatigue
31. -80 = progress
32. -80 new toys
33. ARTS = safety
34. -80 easier
35. I enjoy -80
36. use features
37 15,2_4 7901 4415 30,850
37 365 290 37 I, 1 80
36 ii 19 0 90
37 62 26 1 99
37 37 20 1 80
37 53 27 1 99
37 53 27 1 99
37 58 15 25 99
37 34 23 1 80
37 49 27 1 99
37 56 24 1 99
37 54 25 1 99
37 58 22 25 99
37 62 25 1 99
36 58 27 5 99
37 59 23 1 99
37 70 21 20 99
36 43 23 1 99
36 53 21 1 99
35 38 24 1 99
36 37 25 1 99
36 36 22 1 99
36 48 25 1 99
36 68 17 25 99
37 48 23 1 99
37 43 22 1 95
37 47 27 1 99
37 45 25 1 9g
37 47 28 1 99
37 66 23 1 99
37 61 25 1 99
37 54 28 5 99
37 67 19 25 99
37 80 13 50 99
37 33 21 1 85
37 71 17 25 99
37 60 22 1 99
37 77 21 25 99
37 70 18 25 99
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÷Table 2-B
WAV_
Item N Mean s,m, Min Max
total time
tlme in -80
days since -80 flt
I. challenging
2. good old days
3. loss of skills
4. hand fly
5. enjoy hand fly
6. too far w/ auto
7. hand vs. auto
8. mod important
9. more automation
I0. future autc
ii. autothrottles
12. y_ung vs. old
13. overuse of auto
14. mana5u flight
15. time problems
16. old resist
17. mcrp tn watch
18. auto profit
19. auto not help
20. not worth $
21. auto is useful
22. autoland
23. company wants
24. cat II &III
25. reliability
26. sudden failures
27. less workload
28. new = reliable
29. too hlUCh auto
30. reduce fatigue
31. -80 = progress
32. -80 new toys
33. ARTS = safety
34. -80 easier
35. I enjoy -80
36. use features
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
19
20
20
20
20
20
2O
2O
13,891
674
12
62
40
55
60
53
46
42
47
57
56
52
62
60
68
39
54
44
43
36
44
69
49
49
42
40
44
70
6O
48
67
81
29
67
60
75
72
8031
310
15
23
19
28
26
18
22
22
23
19
21
24
19
22
20
18
21
24
24
14
22
17
17
21
19
21
23
13
15
23
18
12
i0
18
16
17
16
4500
i00
0
1
1
1
12
12
1
1
1
25
25
12
1
25
25
1
10
1
1
i0
1
30
i0
25
25
5
5
4O
3O
18
25
65
1
i0
25
48
33
28,000
1,350
45
99
75
91
99
87
75
83
85
88
87
99
90
99
99
75
86
75
88
6O
99
99
75
75
85
75
75
9O
85
95
99
99
75
99
87
99
99
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Table 3
Graphic presentation of attitude scales
The following figures graphically depict the means and
standard deviations of the 36 Likert scales for Wave One and Wave
Two. The 36 scales are grouped by subject matter. The groupings
are not by statistical clustering.
3-A
3-B
3-C
3-D
3-E
3-F
General attitude toward automation and flying
Impact of automation on skills maintenance/erosion
Specific equipment capabilities; -80 in general
Pilot age and acceptance of automation
Equipment reliability and safety
Impact of automation on perceived workload,
fatigue, motivation and cockpit management
For each scale, there is a pair of lines: the top line
represents the data for Wave One, and the bottom line for Wave
Two. The center of each line is the mean, and the length of the
line in each direction from the center is one standard deviation.
If the distribution of responses to the Likert scales were
normally distributed, the length of the line should represent
about 68% of the [esponses. See Table 2-A and 2-B for exact
values.
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Figure 3-A
le
2.
6.
7.
.
.
10.
18.
19.
20.
29.
Flying today is more challenging than ever.
I miss the "good old days" of simpler aircraft.
I think they've gone too far with automation.
I can fly the airplane as smoothly and safely by
hand as with automation.
It is important to me to fly the most modern plane
in the company's fleet.
I look favorably on automation in the cockpit --
the more the better.
I am looking forward to even more automation in
future planes.
Automation is the thing that is going to turn
this industry around and make it profitable again.
Automation may be helpful in long-haul operations,
but not for short-segment operations like ours.
All these new features are nice to have, but
they're not worth the money.
Too much automation can be dangerous.
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Figure 3-B
3. I am concerned about a possible loss of my
flying skills with too much automation.
4. I hand fly par_ of every trip to keep my skills up.
5. Hand flying is the part of the t[ip I enjoy the most.
13. Pilots who overuse automation will see their flying
skills suffer.
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Figure 3-C
C. ._l_._.ifiE_._lali/_.n_ capabilities, and the -80 in_
11.
31.
34.
I wish we had full autothrottle on the -10s,
-30s, and -50s.
Autoland capability would definitely enhance safety.
Cat II arid Cat III operations would mean very
little to ou: company.
I think that the -80 is a significant step forward
in short and medium haul aircraft.
The -80 is just anothe: DC-9 with some new toys.
The ARTS feature of the -80 is a real plus for
safety on takeoff.
Flying the -80 is definitely easier than flying
the older models.
I en3oy flying the -80 more than the older DC-9s.
I like to use the new features of the -80 as
much as possible.
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Figure 3-D
12. Younger pilots catch on to automation faster than
older ones.
16. Older pilots seem to resist the new technologies.
Figure 3-E
25.
26.
28.
I have serious concerns about the reliability
of this new equipment.
I am worried about sudden failures of the new
digital devices like the DFGS and the ARTS.
The new equipment is more reliable than the old.
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Figure 3-F
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14.
15.
17.
21.
23.
Automation frees me of much of the routine,
mechanical parts of flying so I can concentrate
more on "managing" the flight.
I spend more time setting up and managing the
automation (such as the DFGS) than I would
hand flying or using old style autopilots.
Automation does not reduce workload, since there
is more to keep watch over.
I use automatic devices a lot just because I find
thea useful.
I use automatic devices mainly because the
company wants me _o.
Automation reduces overall workload.
erall, automation reduces pilot fatigue.
23
STRONGLY
DISAGREE
!
DISAGREE
I
NEITHER AGREE
NOR DISAGREE
I
14.
L
AGREE
I
STRONGLY
AGREE
I
-4
!5.
t : I
17.
I'-
121.
!
23.
27.
I : I
30.
I
, n
!
I
23a
gLk
Table 4-A and 4-B
Frequency-of-use chart
Crew members were instructed to enter into each appropriate cell
the per cent of legs on which they used each "80 feature, during
five phases of flight. Thus the numerical values from 0 to 100
could be entered.
Some of the cells are by their nature invalid - e.g. autobrake at
cruise. Crews were instructed to place an "X" in each invalid
cell.
Examination of the data reveals that there was some confusion
about this instruction, and in some places entries, particularly
zeros, were placed in invalid cells. Thus, the reader should not
take seriously the statistical values foc cells with very small
sample sizes. For example, three respondents entered a numerical
value for the use of the dial-a-flap at cruise.
The data are expressed as follows:
Mean % Standard Dev. % (Sample size *)
For example, the Wave One data for altitude hold at cruise reads:
94 23 (34)
meaning that the mean usage of the 34 pilots responding was 94%
of the legs, with an S.D. of 23%.
* Number (out of totali responding with numerical value.
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OF pOOR QUALITY
Table 5-1 to 5-5
Open-ended questions
What feature or piece of equipment not presently
in the -80 would you like to have installed?
Since flying the -80, have you seen any confusion
or incorrect operation on the part of other crew
members?
Are there any features or modes of the -80 that
you are still not sure of or comfortable with?
What features wet? the hardest for you to learn?
What do you think the problem was?
If you could make any changes in the cockpit
layout, equipment or modes of the -80, what would
you like to change?
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Table 5-1
Question I. What feature or piece of equipment not presently in
the -80 would you like to have installed?
Equipment
Responses:
Wave
1 2
Performance data computer system (PDCS)
Long range navigation *
Groundspeed readout
None (stated as such - not blank)
Blank
Non-glare glass on all instruments
Improved pressurization control
Individual heading, airspeed controls for DFGS
Push-button entry for zero fuel weight
Forward "blue room" (lavatory)
Mirror to check wingtips
Red light illuminating V-speed book
Collision avoidance system
Doppler radar
Red instrument lights
StandDy frequency on VORs
Aural altitude alert
Head-up display
Wind shear detector
More visible "caution" lights
Faster cancelling of gear-up warning
Stabilizer adjusting syste
Pencil holder
Overhead hand hold to aid seat adjustment
Improved light rheostats
High frequency radio
Improved seats
Cat II capability
8 3
7 3
5 3
2 2
2 3
1
2
2 2
1
1
1
2
3
1
1 1
1
6 1
4 1
1
1
1
1
1 i
1
1
1
1
1
Total responses 57 23
* includec RNAV, Olaega, and INS
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ITable 5-2
Question 2. Since flying the -80, have you seen any confusion o_
incorrect operation on the part of other crew members? Please
describe.
(The author has attempted where possible to preserve the exact
language of the respondents. In some places, for clarity or
compactness, the language is paraphrased. Replies simply
yes/no are not included.)
WAVE D_
(6 respondents)
Rarely see errors.
standardized.
Only in new crew members. We are well
Turning the wrong knob, pushin_ the wrong Dutton, deprogramming
the DFGS and neutralizing it.
Minor at:ors in the DFGS setup.
b. __ZASnn___nn_ _.eeJ a_a _ach_
(6 respondents)
Some pilots don't seem to realize that these are distinct
features.
Confusion as to what the speed select and Mach select buttons
will do to A/T and pitch command as opposed to IAS hold and
Mac_ hold.
New F/Os not sure which mode to use.
Spd/Mach control usage at _ntermediate altitudes - esp. low lim.
l
c. Autothrottle _ _ (8 respondents)
Managing the ATS, especially going from climb EPR to cruise with
a low level off - e.g. 'level at 3000, maintain !70'.
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I Clamping ATS when they didn+t mean to
Ezce6sive use of ATS at low altitude
Initially confusion on how to maintain throttles at idle
descent
Waiting for vower to come on in descent
Use of spd select during idle descent on profiles
Spd sel knob hard to operate in fast slew position
d. A/P an_ AI_T _i_n (5 respondents)
"It's bard to program AlP and AIT fast enough to keep up with
ATC, so we uncouple and fly by hand."
Confusion about overlapping functions of the A/T and A/P and
improper interpretation of the FMA Defore mode selection.
Unfamil!arit_ and incorrect use of A/P and A/T for takeoff,
climb and descent.
"Most incorrect operations center around the use of the A/T and
A/P speed control, :esulting in a CLAMP indic@tion on the FMA."
e. __p./u_LQn in_u1_ll (6 respondents)
"It takes two months of line flying, about 150 hours, to
understand all the systems."
"Not always in proper T/O mode when we begin T/O - mode confusion."
Controls are more sensitive - hdg knob, alt select...it takes a
lot of time and experience.
"Reaching to wrong positions for switches and radios - it's
different from other DC-gs."
f. _ rm_
Forgot to select speed/Macn selector for cruise speed.
comment after descending to new altitude.
Same
Pilots not arming altitude alerter.
"Flap retraction time, and turn with altitude restriction,
3O
forgetting to reprogram, so I'll snap off A/P and A/T and hand
fly." *
Difficulty in operating flap handle after dial-a-flap T/O.
(2 respondents)
Confusion over which function to use, like SPD SEL or CL-EPR.
Hard to set up DFGS for back-course ILS
Flap/slat retract systems
* Not clear what is meant by reference to flap retraction time.
me,
KEY/TWO
ao
(6 respondents)
Having A/P disengage for no reason causes real confusion, esp. on
IFR approaches
Forgetting to put in new altitude to capture
Moving pitch wheel when capture has started
Forgot to set assigned altitude and forgot to push Math and A/S
on A/T control
Turning the wrong knobs, like course instead of hdg
In leveloff, tendency not to let the A/P do it for jou -
reverting back to earlier aircraft
_e E_ betw_o_ i_5 a_d Mach hold. and _eed and
select (none)
c. Autoth_j_ _ _ (7 respondents)
Management of ATS and speed selector in general (3)
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A/S kneb clumsy to turn
ATS surging and clamp mode
ATS is area of confusion during a busy approach when things start
to happen
d. AIP _nd ALT _
•L ,,
"Confusing" (2)
e. _._ in _./19./_ (6 respondents)
Pushing the wrong button (Spd/M) (2) Spd/M and hdg knobs too
simil_r in feel, and sometimes have the same numbers (e.g. 2i0
ma_ hdg. and airspeed). Captains manipulate the wrong one often.
Grabbing t:he wrong knob on the DFGS
Misreadin_l the A/S bug for the V-ref (white) bug
Having to reset dial-a-flap because setting (detent) can't be
found with flap handle
"Most _f us have been in the -80 for quite a while, and most of
the incorrect procedures are just a matter of getting in a hurry
and not thinking"
f. _ f.mmnm_
B
m,
Forgetting to put in the new ZFW
Forgetting to slew the heading bug before T/O
Not checking the FMA when making a speed, heading, or altitude
change (2)
32
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Table 5_3
Question 3. Are there any features nr modes of the -80 that you
are still not sure about or comfortable with?
(-80 flying time of respondent to the closest 50 hours is
included in parentheses)
_ONE
No (800, I00, 500, 750, 400, 150, 550, 600, I000, 1200, 800,
150, I00, 50, 200, 400, I00, 300, 450)
"No, but company should be more specific on how descents should
be made -- Mach hold, speed select, or clamp. Standardization
is the key to a good flight." (800)
"No, except that the plane is so automated that my last 6-
month check was not exactly perfect." (600)
"I'm not sure why, after cruising at M. 76, when you push in
speed/Mach set knob, it reverts back to Mach after displaying
airspeed. You then have to push _peed select to keep the speed
you want." (150)
"I'm not ever comf _rtable with the A/P to intercept a LOC/GS
course. I can do it so much smoother and almost i_unediately
establish a decent wind correction crab. Then I'll engage the
ILS/TRK feature." (300)
"Alert arm feature sometime disarms itself. A/T lags behind
speed selected and then over-controls to get speed back. A/T
oscillates excessively in cruise." (400) (See footnote, p. 87)
"I'm still new and my -80 time has been spread over a long
period. Conflict with A/T and A/P and some nomenclature
(confusing). Also IAS/Mach hold." (50)
"Speed/Mach selector does not always change to correct mode."
"Upon engaging the A/P after takeoff, about 70% of time there is
a disagreement between A/C trlm and A/P logicg with resulting
uncomfortable pitch changes. I haven't been able to determine if
I fail or the system does." (i00)
"A change in clearance within 20 miles of an airport seem3 to
increase my workload at my experience level." (50)
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ATS (50, 200)
"-80 doesn't descend like other DC-9s. A/Ts often spool engines
when not wanted (often not noticed at night) when trying to
_scend. End up high and fast on approaches, so you have to plan
further ahead with cushion." (150)
Turbulence mode -- haven't needed it yet (400)
A/Ts on idle power descents come up when I think they shouldn't
(150)
Still don't understand the ATS. I disconnect them for descent
and reconnect for final app:oach (400)
Use of DFGS on back-course ILS (400)
"Altitude hold -- I've seen A/C leave captured altitude four
times. Each time the alt sel knob had slipped into the next
detent, higher or lower" (200)
WAVE y_O
(400, 800, 1350, 350, 600, 900, 1150, 1200, 800, 700, 600NO
700, 600, 700, 400, 800)
Aft capture and approach capture and track on A/P (400)
Using dial-a-flap settings (400)
LOC-only approach -- push VOR-LOC for capture; push ILS and it
will still capture (102)
Autoland and auto G/A (350)
A/Ts sometimes clamp at wrong T/O EPR (600)
VOR capture and track mode not very smooth for the money (600)
34
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Tabie 5-4
Ouestion 4. What features were the hardest for you to learn?
Question 4(a) What do you think the problem was?
(Flying time in -80 to closest 50 hours in parentheses)
EKEE _KE
A/T and speed/Mach and its relationship to pitch (800, 150)
A/T. At time instructors weren't sure how it worked (150)
A/T. Reverting to Lo Lim after being _etarded (150, 150)
A/T. Not enough instruction _150)
A/T in general (50, 150, 150, 200); Integration of computer into
specific modes (50); Inadequate training for modes {150)
A/T smoothness -- trying to cope with built _n problem (200)
All systems fairly easy; no difficulty (300, 1200, 600, 50)
Remembering to put proper flap setting into CG computer and
stowing the flap detent on climb checklist. Rushing to get
everything done between the time when I get weight tab and engine
start (300)
DFGS (500, 800, 400, i00, 400). Lac_ of experience. Easy to
learn, just more to learn than anythlng else. "I'm not used to
computers. _ Way it was presented in ground school. Lack cf a
simulator. No simulator, 3ust a static airplane
Getting used to quiet cockpits after flying -10s (750)
A/T - A/? relationship (600, 150, 50, 550, i00, 400, 400)
Lack of expec_ence - I fly -30 a lot (2 respondents:.
Ext:_e number of ptssibilities w_th new features, and
co[apany'z inslstence on using them all most of the tlme.
Some nomenclatu[e doesn't help.
I think the two systems (A/P and A/T) should be taught
separately, tben combined.
Different ways to maPe a p[oper descent. (800)
Descents are the only "zone of confusion."
35
bl
Speed/Mach selector. What you get when you push in on the
button, depending on what mode you are operating in, seems
confusing. Confusing part is keeping in mind what mode you are
in. (400)
Selecting proper mode and checking TARP * (400)
Adjusting to female voice on CAWS. Male voice would be better -
I tend not to listen to women. (500) **
Sequencing the DFGS to produce desired effect. (i000)
New abbreviations - e.g. FMA *. Nothing to relate these to. (100)
Interactions and priorities of systems. You must fly the
equipment to find best way to put it together. (50)
SPD SEL vs. IAS hold - continuous reduction of speed bug to
maintain unspooled condition. Difficulty with different modes,
but this was corrected with e_perience (150)
Checking the FMA (200)
Touching vert spd wheel disconnects ILS (I00)
Use of hdg sel in flying VFR approaches. Too much time with head
in cockpit. I'm used to DC-9 turn knob - can vary bank angle
without looking in cockpit.
None (1200, 600)
* Flight mode annunciator (see Glossary, Appendix 3).
** Not clear whether this is facetious oc serious comment. In
interviews many pilots ob3ected to the CAWS, but not specifically
to female aspect of voice warnings. All but three of the
warnings are female voices.
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WAVE 2_0
None (so stated) (1350, 1150, 800)
I fly the -80 on reserve. There's no continuity in operating it.
I can fly the -80 only twice a month - it screws up learning and
habit patterns. (400)
Insufficient training - no simulator (700)
Control during descent (400)
Separating A/T and A/P functions in my mind due to previous
habits (350)
Habit interference from -50 (350)
Making smooth descent and landing - lack of experience (800)
Interrelation of A/T modes and speed functions.
from the factory in r_lationships (600)
A/T in general; lack of training (700)
A/T functions too complex (100)
A/T, Spd/M and A/P control; lack of proper 9rcund school
preparation (400)
FRA - learning all the modes and learning to watch it (600)
ATS in descent - hard to get slowed down, esp, if you stay high
for fuel conservation and ATC gives you a speed restriction in
descent (900)
ATS in descent - lack of experience. Descent and approach phase
are more difficult with this system (700)
Connecting A/P smoothly so soon after T/O; rate of climb between
A/C and A/P are not in sync (1200)
Separating A/P and F/D in my mind; pushing IAS on A/P when I
should have pushed F/D; the problem was Re (600)
Poor instruction
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Table 5-5
Question 5. If you could make any changes in the cockpit layout,
equipment or modes of the -80, what would you like to change?
_ONE
Nothing (so stated - not blank) (8 respondents)
Left blank (3 respondents)
Aural "speed brake" warning (on touchdown) removed.
Presently if the DFGC goes off, we lose altitude capture. Change
so that anytime A/P is coupled, we would have alt capture.
Individualize DPGS, A/S, and heading bugs. Make it possible to
p:ogram hundreds of feet (it's hard to push knob and twist).
Also for A/S and heading you have to look in two places, the
instrument itself and the DFGS (to set _ugs).
Cockpit lighting. (8)
In summary, complaints about the white lighting, and
necessity to turn up floods to see the V-speed card.
Recommendations for red light over the V-speed card.
recommended lighting be like older DC-9s.
Several
Better way to prevent accidental tail cone deployment.
Ground-speed readout should be added.
"Desensitize" AIT at cruise.
Have VOR accept drift correction that has been established.
Backlight fo_lowing switches:
Mach sel, VOR/LOC, ILS.
IAS hold, Mach hold, EPR lim,
Button to silence CAWS. (2) One suggests mounting it or_ control
wheel, and elimirating 80% of CAWS alerts.
Seats are uncomfortable (2)
Interference when ATC gives a change and capt. reaches £o[
alt knob as F/O reaches for ppiiitcn wheel.
Comparator between the two A/P com_uters. If one goes bad,
3_
both are inoperative and you have no A/P. Should be a way to
override them or separate them so the good one can be used.
Amber light on radar altimeter too bright, esp. with voice
warning of "minimums." Seen as "distracting and unsafe."
Get rid of ATS
Make pressurization more automatic -- like Boeing (727-200)
Vocation of wing light switches_ and other external light
switches. No_e light switch is mounted slightly higher than
the wing light switches. Makes it appear that landing lights
are in mid or extended position. Not so on older models of
DC-9 - they were aligned.
Two heading knobs and two pitch wheels to keep from getting in
each other's way.
Change speed knob to have different feel from course knob (2).
Better speed knob (i)
Suppress voice warning system on ground.
Altitude alert - takes too long to select the 100-foot levels.
Remove ALFA speed on A/Ts.
Old style (dial and pointer) fuel gauges (in place of digital).
Change trigger point for gear warning from 210 knots (presumably
to lower speed).
Eliminate undesired engine rpm increase when gear is lowered.
Move descent wheel (vert spd) and turn knob to center console.
CAWS warnings too "piercing" -- make more subtle and less
repetitious.
Update flight and performance instruments and displays to more
modern, easily-read, like C-141 tape instruments.
More reliable air data computer
Go to -50 A/P with spd/M hold.
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WAVE _O
None (_o stated)
Blank (2)
Move green oxygen bottle to corner
Relocate turn knob to center pedestal
Cockpit lighting: general (2); red lighting on V-speed cards (7)
Change feel of knobs for A/S and course (make distinguishable)
Put in 20 degree flap notch so you don't have to dial it (2)
Relocate TCI * on the pedestal behind the throttles with
annunciator in the same place
Change gear warning to 180 kts
Relocate pitch and roll modes of A/P tn center pedestal
Functions related to each pilot's task should be assigned to his
side of the cockpit
Add a minimum fuel warning
Vibration monitor more centrally located
Give each pilot his own hdg and spd controls
Make it easier for F/O to load the correct ZFW -- has to reach to
ca2tain's panel and twist knob
Change A/S bugs so DFGS and V-ref are not confused so easily
Flap/slat handle should be as easy tc move as other DC-9s
Add groundspeed readout
Eliminate unnecessary CAWS warnings -- like landing gear above
5000 feet and spoiler deploye_ on ground
Make it like a -50; eliminate all the training and cockpit
confusion. We made it a separate status, proving that pilots
find it tough to go back and forth.
* Thrust Computer Indicator (see Glossary, Appendix ?).
4O
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Difficult to select TCI .-- esp. at low altitude, critical times
of flight
A/S speed bug should be visible under all conditions
Smo3ther operating A/Ts
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Table 6
The following comments were written on the Wave One
questionnaire form8_ in response to no particular question.
I. I have been flying from MSP to PHX to SNA. The weather has
been very good most of the time, so we have not made any ILS
approaches. When the weather is bad coming into MSP, we _ostly
use the aut_pilot coupled with ILS. It works very well. I have
never used the flight dlrector very much on any airplane, so I
can't use it much now. However, I use it 100% for takeoff. I
think the autopilot-autothrottle combination works very well.
However, I must use it regularly, or I will get _usty with it.
Also my instrument flying ability has gone down hill. Flying the
-80 you are really only a computer programmer. I now have
decided to fly the -80 one month and the -30 one month, rotating
back and forth. If the company wants us to fly the -80 all the
time, they should give us who want it a couple of hours per month
in a -30 simulator to keep our instrument flying proficienJy up.*
2. My most difficult task is a high VFR approach to an airport
that requires rapid changes in airspeed, configuration and pitch.
In this case I can do a smoother job hand flying. I don't have
the eye-hand judgement coordination down yet when using the DFGS.
Also, if the station used in VOR Nay is oscillating, I fly
heading select because it's smoother.
The -80 is paradoxical. To be effective, safe and smooth with
the automation, you must use it _s much as possible. However, I
am afraid I will lose tou:h with my manual flying skills if I
don't fly it manually as well. I feel pilots flying the -B0
should only fly the -80. The programming of the DFGS requires
too much time with eyes in the cockpit if you don't fly it
regularly. I feel that once you become skilled in programming
the DFGS, you can keep your eyes outside more and it will be
safer. Overall, I think the -80 is the neatest thing since night
baseball.
3. TRI (Thrust _ating Indicator) - there is no specific setting
for descent. It will remain at CRS (cruise) until set to GA (go-
around) during the in-range check.
Speed/Mach Control - It is my policy to have the internal bug set
(by using this control) at my target IAS/Mach regardless of the
use of the aucothrottle.
* This p_oDlem was largely resolved by the introduction of the
"s_parate status n agreement. See p. 96, paragraph i0.
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VOR/LOC Capture - Used very little since the equipment is much
too sensitive relative to the quality of the nay aids. The A/C
is much too "jerky" on the Loc and "sloppy" on VORs. If these
inadequacies were corrected, I would u_e the capability from 75%
to I00%.
Autobrake - I only use about 25% of the time - short runways, and
high gross weight. I normally don;t manually employ the brakes
until below 80 knots.
4. I find that I am so busy with the auto]0ated portion of the
aircraft that I am not looking outside the cockpit. I feel,
however, that as I get more proficient, this will change. A few
hours in a simulator with a good instructor could have made by
transition much easier.
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V. CHE_ -MAN INTERVIEWS
DC-9-80 check airmen were interviewed in Minneapolis and Las
Vegas. The intent of the interviews was to explore the
experiences and difficulties, if any, encountered by the newly
transitioning -80 pilots. In m&ny instances it was difficult to
separate this question from the check airman's own perception of
the airplane. The comments are summarized below by general topic
areas. In some places these are direct quotations, in others
paraphrasing. Since check airmen were interviewed separately
from line pilots, no distinction is made here between first and
second wave interviews. These interviews occurred throughout
the study, due to the fact that new crews were being trained at
the two -80 domiciles at various times. Most check airmen
interviews were performed early in the first waves at MSP and LAS
in order to probe opinions during initial checkout and training
of the -80 pilots.
New pilots tend to get behind - head in the cockpit. The FMA is
new and they don't understand the modes. It takes one trip just
to get the SPD/Mach control straight, and longer to master the
FMA.
It's a new environment and people don't realize now different it
is, especially when things go wrong. Lot of pilots think of St
as an old plane with some new systems. But it's heavier, faster,
and longer. Things go faster. The biggest problem is getting the
three systems (F/D, A/P, and A/T) werking together - it takes
longer than I would have thought. It takes a month just to be
able to operate it. The secret Js scanning the FMA.
"Overall, the system is 'stable' since you can always push the
yellow button (A/P disconnect) and turn it back into a DC-9."
Questions the dollar value and wishes the company hadn't bough5
it. Likes the fact that the heading bug can be set from either
side. Otherwise prefers the -50 avionics.
In Initial Operating Experience (ICE), pilots had head in the
cockpit too much.
/_eLL  u a
Tendercy of new pilots to "give up." "If a problem arises
(e.a. computer failure), neophytes will give up instead of trying
to solve the problem. A simulator would help 100%." Sees some
resistance to new features, especially on first trip. Some see
cockpit as mtoo complicated" at first, b,,t when they master it
would prefer to fly the -80 c.ver other models.
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Saw some initial resistance. Some said they would prefer that -80
just be a new DC-9 with 217 enginfs, and no new features.
Pilots didn'_ like ground school - called it computer
programming. See_ three distinct pha_es of attitude toward the -80
on part of newcomers:
i. "It's just another DC-9"
2• "It's neat - it's fun to fly"
3. "It doesn't work" - skepticism about the reliability
"Complacency would be the big problem if the stuff worked.
a good thing that automation does not work all the time."
It's
Reliability/Confidence _o.r,,Ja_,._D._
Complaints about the 904 flight guidance computer. Two check
airmen reported that with bank angle limiter set to 30 degrees,
the plane would bank 45 degrees, and attributed it to the 904.
Unreliability of the equipment is the biggest problem• *
Several pilots mentioned the problem (also attributed to the 904)
that if both Nay receivers were not set to the same ILb
frequency, the plane would fly through the localizer without a
capture maneuver. Also mentioned were brief interruptions of the
computer, and the fact that then power was restore4, it might
revert to an earlier mode•
"Have seen it (altitude hold) disconnect and leave an altitude -
we didn't catch it till the 250 (actually _00) foot alarn_ went
off."*
Criticism of A/T at cruise, especially in mountainous terrain.
"Doesn't do as well as the -50 in IAS and Math hold."
Skill acquisition/loss _ J_
-80 studenLs in transition feel that they lose manual skills and
suffer when they have to take a 6-month check in a -30 simulator.
Hasn't seen any sign of skill loss. Gave a -30 simulator check
to a pilot who had flown only e -80 for a year, and he had no
problem.
Pilots talk about "loss of scan," but I don't worry about
it. There is no skill loss as long as I hand fly some. His
practice is to hand fly below 10,000 feet on every third leg, and
fly a -50 trip occasionally• Doesn't see any difference in the
way be flies the 50.
* See footnote, p. 85.
F"
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Doesn't see any problem.
fiy occasionally.
Use everything that is there, and hano
Most pilots llke to do some hand flying. All should be made to.
Check airman flies an entire leg by hand, but admits that it is
less economical -- that A/P and A/T combination can fly the leg
more economically. "My scan pattern would be zero if I used it
(automation) all the time."
There is "major confusion" between the A/P and the A/w, e.g_ CLMP
annunciation. LAS pilots didn't fly the -50, so they did not
have much experience with Mach hold and IAS hold. Former Boeing
pilots did better in transition. Problem was which mode to use
to hold airspeed.
At SNA, new pilots didn't know how to pull the power back at
i000' (for noise abatement cutback).
Secret to flying the -80 is "do what it take to give a smooth
ride and reduce woK_load. Don't get 'stereotyped.' Use
automation when appropriate."
The basic problem in school was "bits and pieces" - e.g. the A/P,
A/T, and F/D. But the plane is one package, and this should be
emphasized in school. *
Pilots should ride the jumpseat before going co school.
It takes 50 to i00 hours to be comfortable. Out-the-window time
in the -80 is about half what it was in the -30. We're too busy
inside.
The problems are consistent. At aLout I0,000' we get behind and
high. The "whiz wheel" (hand-held vertical descent computer)
prevents this.
On a ccupled approach, trainee hit the wrong button - VOR/LOC
instead of ILS. You need to learn to "preprogram u, especially
the speed bug. Complains of "fixation on digital displays." He
puts tape over speed and heading window on DFGS to force trainees
to look at the bugs. On older DC-9s, the control and the
information was in the same place.
* See Page 96, paragraph ii.
One pilot sees little difference Detween the -80 and
earlier models in this repsect, but the others stated chat
workload is less and fatigue less, once pilots become familiar
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with systems and procedures. Two stated that the -80 allows more
tame for out-the-window scan.
"After a couple of months, an -8_ is easier to fly.
it longer (than -50) and feel less fatigue."
I could fly
"There is less fatigue if the systems work as designed. If you
keep up with the plane, the -80 allows more out-the-window time."
One check airman expressed belief that there is more requirement
for monitoring activity in the -80, but another who mentioned
monitoring said it was no different than the -50, which also
demanded a lot o: monitoring.
Initially there is more workload, then less. But if you include
monitoring, there is no difference in total workload. In a
terminal area, you spend a lot of time monitoring and use you_
hands a lot, so workload may increase.
Likes the CAWS and the voice warnings, but would also like to
have the aural tone ('beep') restored to the altitude alerter
(for 750 feet prior to selected altitude).
"Overkill - the aural alerts are by biggest complaint about the
80." it is distracting at critical times. E.g., you're hi@h and
slow down (below 210 knots) and get "landing @ear," and it-s too
loud. "Speed brake" (after touchaown) is annoying. "Stabilizer
in motion" is not needed. T/O configuration warnings are too
critical - should have high tolerances (see next comment).
Concer_ for the "cry wolf" problem (excessive false alarms). But
generelly likes the idea of voice warnings, especially for T/O
configuration errors (see above). Some warnJngs are annoying and
distracting - e.g. "Speed brake" after touchdown. Complains that
"stabilizer in motion" does not always annunciate on ground
check. "When a computer says something, it should be real." 4.
"As long as I can turn it off, it's OK."
Ob]ection of gear-up warning speed (2i0 kts°). It should be 180.
* In interviews with check airmen and line pilots, cemment_
a)out GPWS voice warnings were often included along with comments
on the CAWS. The GPWS is a separate system, but the two are
often seen as one since they both give voice annuciations.
** Most of these "false alarms" were associated with early
models of the DFGC, and ?'er_ corrected in later models.
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Would like to mute some voice warnings, and set higher (less
critical) trigger points on others, e.g. stabilizer in motion.
Make master caution light brighter.
Restore tone for i000' before preselected altitude.
uCAWS is overdone. 'Speed brake' on landing is unnecessary.
can be heard in the cabin." *
It
Doesn't like radar altimeter - requires too many turns to set.
Doesn't like voice "minimums w alert.
In a rapid descent, with a crossing restriction, the AJP trim
lags _3hind, the light comes on, possibly no capture.
A/P is too sensitive in pitch control - in turns as well as
straight and level. Needs to be damped.
Likes coupled approach especially for a low-low approach, but for
less demanding approaches, prefers to fly with F/D. On visual
approach likes to use A/P and spend time looking out the window.
On the 50, he hand flew visual approaches.
Confusion between A/T and A/P functions. "The plane is not a -
30. If you fly it like one, you'll be high and late."
Pilots forget bank angle limiter and leave it at 15 degrees.
should be at i0 degrees above 180 kts.
It
S_veral mentions of killing the altitude capture by moving the
vertical speed knob.
Flap handle is a problem for the F/O...difficult to seat.
Vertical speed knob is awkward, esp. in turbulence.
The symbol (on HSI) for the course selector (+) :s also on the
knob, but the heading (triangle) is an "H" on the kneb. Speed
symbol (red triangle) is also the same.
Dial-a-flap and CG trim readout and indicators have opposite
indications (numbers increase in opposite directions).
Objects to vertical speed wheel on glareshield instead of rearer
console.
* Corrected in the 907 DFGC, approximately February 1985.
J
Area navigation (specifically mentioned Omega)
Head-up display (HVD)
Collision avoidance system (CAS)
Aural tone on altitude alerter (I000' before altitude)
(2 respondents)
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VI. LINE PILOT INTERVIEWS
WAVE _ _
mr
F_
It's the future of the fleet - I got the jump on others, since it
was during summertime.
New equipment - "intriguing." (5 respondents)
New plane - advanced guidance system - "a neat DC-9."
Would have been forced to due to (lack of) seniority.
Enjoy the systems. I read up on it and passed up a bid on the
Boeing (727) to wait for the -80.
Good trips for commuters.
Talked to pilots who have flown it.
I alternate between captain on a Convair (580) and a F/O on the
DC-9. I like the -80 over other DC-9s. It's the future generation
-- closer to the 757/767.
New plane and new technology. More options for bidding trips.
I'm low on seniority list - on -80 can avoid poor trips. Also I
prefer new planes.
New sophisticated equipment. I bid it with only 2.5 years to
retirement.
Forced bid. Like the trips - higher utilization (more hard
time).
Didn't know much about automation. Never thrilled with the
Boeing, so withdrew a Boeing bid to bid the 80. I like
McDonnell-Douglas' approach to systems.
Advanced aircraft. Didn't see the Boeing as a_ advance.
New plane, new features, more engine power.
_,_ about lh_ -8o and_
Like the plane - good on fuel efficiency. Will like it more when
I learn the FMA better.
5O
With rapid ATC changes, difficult to reprogram rapidly. (2_ "In hand
flyin@, the programming is done in your head."
Would have preferred to upgrade old fleet, e.g. strobe lights
Would like to see more separation between the knobs (DFGS). They
should be shape coded.
More difficult when you get last minute instructions (ATC) - e.g.
to land on 19 instead of 25 at LAS.
Like the flexibility of the options - wish I knew more about
them.
At first I was always behind. With rapid ATC changes I would
click it off. Now I use automation all I can. First month is
rough - more planning is needed due to faster climb rate. Glad I
didn't have to go back and forth to older models. I've been in
the right seat 13 years, and this has me fired up again.
On 80, when I hand fly, I feel that I'm out on the end of a long
pole (reference to length of fuselage and handling
characteristics).
I like automatic systems when they work properly. Took less than
a month to get comfortable...four trips SNA-PHX (four legs).
It's clean, so you must plan descents earlier. Programming is
complicated.
Not enthusiastic about automation. Wish the company had bought
an -80 with the new engines, but configured like 50. (2)
Backlighting pushbutton switches on DFGS would help avoid
confusion over modes. (3)
Not completely at home yet. Today I had a G/A (go-around) at SNA
due to small plane traffic. Due to complexity, I clicked it off.
Over the years I haven't flown a plane with auto G/A so I flew
the way I knew how.
Ground school instructor at LGB was confused, esp. over DFGS.
Still things I don't know. Instructors should have told us it is
the same as the 50, the big difference being the A/T.
Terminology is new (e.g. CLMP). CSS was a good tool.
Early difficulty - "which do I push now?" After two months, felt
at home. CSS (cockpit systems simulator) helped teach how to set
up approach.
Even hand flying the -80 is easier (thaJ_ other DC 9s) - it's more
stable. I've hand flown all the way from MSP te PHX.
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Not all that different - it's still a DC-9. But I can fly it
smoother. Heading bug and bank angle limiter much smoother on 80.
Reliability no problem in general. I have had ILS fail to
capture. Flies too far, then tries to turn back and never gets
to track.
Less stable on final since it's cleaner. Have to start
dirtying plane earlier. Hard to slow it dcwn near runway.
I had trouble breaking habit of going to the HSI fo_ the heading
bug. Also got the w_ong knob on the DFGS -- speed instead of
heading.
General concern about reliability of automatics. (2)
What__lik_n_mu_ the_t_?
Smoother powerback
Checklist almost same as -50
Quieter cockpit (3)
Not having to do uplatch check (landing gear) (2)
A/T is labor saving (2). Less time managing power, esp. in climb
A/S hold, esp. out of SNA
TCI
Forward Dlue room (lavatory)
N-I sync
Pressurization control
Fast slew on the OBI (CDI)
Automatic APU (2)
Fuel counter reset - don't have to hold (3)
Master caution and master warning not too bright (too bright in 50)
Twin heads on com radios (10)
No need to test F/D
Individual volume controls on com radios (5)
Radar easier to use (6)
10-mile range on radar
More positive response on reversing
Digital readout of fuel and gross weight (2)
Radio altimeter design (7)
-80 is standardized across fleet
Reliability high
More engine power (4)
Radar - low power - not afraid to use on ground
Autoslats
ARTS
Dual computers - more freedom to set up different options on
the two sides
Location of nay receivers and DFGS - easy for outside scan
Bank angle limiter
Heading bugs can be set on right (2)
DFGS in general (5)
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Digital readout to TAS/SAT
Sigh performance wing
Power and ARTS ("lost engine at SNA - problem was slowing it")
Big ADI
Cockpit lighting in general (3)
Turn wheel ("on 50s, captains snap it around')
Glare shield location of DFGS
Suitcase handle (stab trim control) in way of F/O's view of
stab setting
Pitches over too fast in leveloff from climb. Have to use pitch
wheel to prevent, increasing workload
No groundspeed readout (mlight planes have outstripped
airliners")
Digital ADF doesn't have the range. I can get NARCO (MSP) i00
miles out in a 50, not an 80.
Night lighting White light reflects in windows.
Need to bring up while lights to see V-speed book (5)
Problem of cancelling capture with vertical speed wheel
CDI knob should be down on or below HSI
Too long to crank in ZFW (2)
M.76 is too low for 3?,000. Need chart giving weight-alt-
preferred Mach
ADF hard to reach - have to reach over throttles
DFGS is affected by cold prior to startup
VOR tracking logic - turns back to no-wind heading for heading
change at station passage (2)
Some knobs look too much alike (Spd/M and heading) (2)
Two DME readouts on same instrument confusing
Slat lights - can't tell if mid or full. Would be better if they
said "T/O m and mLandm
Too many turns to set the DH on the radio altimeter (4)
Radar altimeter DH setting only goes to 500 feet
Spd/M and Nav-i controls too simi]ar to be so close to each
other, especially if the nay course and IAS are the same or
similar (digital readings in windows).
Chopped off (not full circle) nose gear steering wheel catches
mike cord
Landing light switches not aligned - nose light switch slightly
higher, giving false impression of being in mid on quick scan
Turn knob should be on pedestal - easier to rest hand (3)
F/O and captain's hands are crossed (on DFGS) - when F/O is PNF
and setting heading and capt. is setting altitude
Rheostats on cockpit lighting not linear - on all DC-9s
Digital readouts (2)
The (7-segment) readouts have failed segments, esp. on DME,
which gives erroneous readouts
Digital readouts - "I can't scan - have to 'focus' on numbers
Nay frequency selector - can lose decimal portion - usually
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solves itself
Not hard to learn - basically it's a 50.
On the LOOP-4 departure (SID) from LAX, the A/P blanks out due to
rapid climb. Also on MUSEL-4 from SNA, especially on Thermal
transition. It can't handle a large bank angle, big intercept
angle, and rapid climb. (2) (See Figure 4).
Rough on engage at 800 feet, if accelerating vertically.
stabilize vert speed before engaging
Should
Love the leveloff, e.g. 2000' at ORD. Never had it go wrong, but
have seen captains fail to pull it out (arm alt capture)
Most errors are our own fault
It can bust an altitude on a rapid climb.
Tends to pitch up or down when you engage it. Especially when
you are light. Complicated by the V2 + I0 rule. Medium weight
V2 + i0 = 142 kts.
No problems. Had one altitude bust. It failed to capture, but I
think it was our fault. Long descent from FL 240 to ll,000 and
I'm not sure it was armed. Have had one or two "breakoffs" uf
alt hold.
Good on VOR track
ground station.
(2). Not as good as I'd like - depends on
I don't turn it on at 800 - I usually hand fly to 10,0Q0.
Out of SNA I was distracted by traffic - speed dropped to V-ref
minus 5.
Autothrottle _ __
Excellent (6). Esp. on T/O. Great to set T/O EPR and climb power.
Hard to understand the IAS hold, then the EPR climb or spd
select. A simulator will help. The 304 computer has helped.
Some guys don't like the low limit - they want the throttles
closed.
Hard to learn. Descending at M.76, at 29,000, you pull the power
off and go to 310 Kts. Can't keep the throttles back at idle.
They tend to jump to low lim, Dut not e_ery time. At cruise I
clic_ it off and go to the book.
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Best feature on the plane (2). Easy to control spd, esp. i_ area
like LAX where you're going to spd ceductions...don't have to
work so hard to stay within i0 kts.
Too sensitive in cruise (5). There are large EPR changes, even
with the 904. Too frequent changes disturbing to passengers.
Great labor-saving device.
Like it on T/O and climbout (2_.
Over level ground it's okay (at cruise), but DEN-PHX the mountain
waves cause it to hunt.
Captains are leery of the AIT - its tendency to CLMP. They blame
it on the A/T and click it off. Captains try to fly it like it's
a 50.
Nice not to have to keep checking airspeed in climb.
Nice in T/O, but it's best in cruise. Bold the Mach.
Has been good since the 904 (DFGS computer).
On descent, it helps to bring throttles up to Lo Lim manually.
Gives a bump when engaging after takeoff. Helps to engage while
flaps are still at 20 de_rees.
On T/O, doesn't clamp properly - too early or too late. On
descent, it shut it off a Lo Lim once staDilized, and then turn
it back on. But it helps reduce workload.
Too "positive" in corrections. I'd like a sensitivity switch.
I'd like it more sensitive on ILS, less at cruise. It's good
on ILS. In IMC, I plug it in and fly it down to i00'. Only
problem is vert speed adjustment.
Favorable - no further comment (5)
In IMC, I trust it. Some ground stations poor (e.g. LAS), but
I'd still use it in weather.
Excellent - but [ get the urge to hand fly.
Excellent if capture angle not too great.
answer.
Failed to capture once at MKE. Don't recall if had both Nav
receivers on the ILS.
Pilot awareness is the
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It's perfect. On my first trip, to MKE, the weather was terrible
and it was great. Rougher the weather, the better it is.
Dislike - too much control movement. I can fly smoother. We
know when to roll in and make drift correction. On a tight
approach I prefer to hand fly with the F/D, but I like the A/T
for airspeed control.
It does a good job generally. I never fly raw data - I at least
use the F/D. In the -50 I sometimes fly raw data.
I like it - I have flown two ILS's with heavy X-wind, and like the
way it handled it. Like the programmable bank angle limiter.
Normally set it at 15 degrees, but will use 25 for LOC and VOR
capture, glideslope capture and track. "I fly this A/C as
automated as possible - that's what it's made for." Some concern
over automation "clicking off" during an approach.
Trouble free. More you use it, more you enjoy it. First two or
three months people clicked it off. Three times I have seen it
_nnunciate LOC CAP a_d fly right through it. You have to watch
it.
Depends on the station...with a good station, it's excellent.
wit's a shame to have to turn it off to make a landing." MSP is
good, depending on the lead-in. I use it whenever I can.
We did it on the -30 and the -50, but never used the A/T. I like
th_ logic of the -80 approach coupler. Capture is good, but you
can get a big A/T surge at level off. Glideslope capture and
tracking good.
Bank angle i_ important. I make approach with it (limiter) set
at I0-15 degrees, and depart with it at 30, especially if you
need a big turn, like PHX east departure, or MUSEL-4 from SNA
(see Figure 4).
I like to hand fly down from i0,000 in good weather, but would
use coupler in bad weather.
"Mixed feelings - if the A/P chokes, you're out of it (the loop).
I have faith in the -80 A/P, but misgivings about using it too
close to the ground. So far have had no trouble.
It's harder with the A/P than to hand fly.
Harder in -80 than -50 due to the turn knob in the 50.
I like to use automation, including the turn knob. (Interviewee
then described in detail a visual approach to 8R at PHX, from
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MSP. Enters at about 225 degrees, with heading of 260 preset for
downwind (6000 feet). Turns base with heading sel_ct (4000 feet)
and alt preselect armed, then captures ;LS loc and glideslope.)
Easier (to steer with) heading bug until final° With A/T you
have more time to look out - don't have to keep checking
airspeed.
Don't like it on a high, fast approach, e.g. visual tu SAN. I
shut off the A/T - it goes to LOW LIM too much I don't use ILS
capture on a visual.
I mix automation with hand flying on visuals_
I don't use automation - too much time in the cockpit.
i hand fly using A/T, or use nothing.
of skills.
I am concerned about loss
I use automation down to 200'
_.__tr_I/ A/Lie/ ]_ 2_ __ [see footnote p. 47)
Favorable view - no further comments (4)
It gets your attention
No problem with false alarms
We'll learn more about it in the simulator. We have no
opportuni_:y to hear the important warnings (e.g. engine fire).
Easy to interpret - e.g. "FIRE - LEFT ENGINE," but it is not a
workload reduction.
It once yelled "FLAPS" on T/O. They were properly set to ii
degrees. It's normally 20, but II for SNA. We set 20 on the left
side, but it didn't matter.
Don't like "STAB IN MOTION" (this mentioned by most interviewees)
Don't like "ALTITUDE"
Don't like "LANDING GEAR" - can't silence in advance
On a rJshed ATC, where they kept you high fast, too much noise.
(This pilot silences ILS-related ground prox warnings by
switching off the ILS freq)
Generally favorable view, but feel it "talks too much" (4)
"MINIMUMS" message too loud (2)
Should speak only for serious alarms (e.g. fire, stall) (2)
GooO, but parameters are too tight on takeoff
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Likes the T/O configuration warnings
Likes fire warnin9 and engine loss warnings
Likes minimums warning on R/A
L1_es uul,figuration alerts fo_ takeoff.
"In any aural systems, .f you have to rely on that, you're
already too far behind the A/C to be helped. FAA insists on it
(CAWS), but I've never been in a position to need it. At SAN I
get sink rate (GPWS) on westerly approach.
"SPEED BRAKE" warning on touchdown unnecess&ry and is distracting
at critical time (3)
It's overkill - esp. clacker plus voice on overspeed
Complaints about "mysterious warnings" (2). On ground, I turned
off left generator and got FLAP. Got "ALTITUDE" on ground at MKE.
false flap warnings on T/O.
Like the 210 knot gear warning logic (4)
Do not like the 210 gear warning logic (4)
Got
[
Would like to have the aural tone (beep) for I000 feet prior to
preset altitude restored (6)
Like it the way it is - light only at i000 feet (6)
Like ALFA speed protection
On approach to SNA, missed the 4000 for 3000 light - got the
voice warning from CAWS at 2600 feet. Had it progran_ed for 3000
foot capture, but probably hit the vertical speed wheel.
At night, when you start APU during taxi, the master caution
light comes on due to low APU oil pressure.
Master caution light too small.
Summary - all comments were favorable to the ABS. Most agreed
that the minimum deceleration was adequate for most runways, that
medium was needed for snort runways, and most mentloned SNA as an
airport where ABS was most useful. Most agreed that there was no
need for ABS on a long runway.
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I use it on every landing, usually at minimum setting.
use it at medium or maximum, especially at night.
At SNA we
I use it only 5-10% of the time, for short runway or poor
weather. I uge it at SNA every time. Usually minimum but min or
med at _NA.
Especially good on the -80 since it is hard to get the nose down.
Some problem of individual variation in deceleration between
aircraft.
Use it 20% of the time. On one lan_ing, the F/O misunderstood me
and set it on max. It slammed the nose down.
-DAnl=n=/la and stab r uUm er
Complaints about the flap handle being mechanically difficult to
work, hard to seat into gate (detent). (9)
Hard to find 20 degree gate - not a positive gate.
configuration alert on the CAWS on ?/O. (2)
Can cause a
Talk to the man in the right seat - he does all the work. We
usually go with standard settings (and don't use dial-a-flap).
Dial-a-flap adds to the workload, but it's at the gate. It is
not being used to full efficiency - we need (takeoff) charts.
I like the flexibility it gives.
summertime T/O from DEN and PHX.
(2) Special mention of
Not sold on it. It's a pain to spin it so long lUSt to get 20
degrees; same for stowing. Stab setting window hard to read.
You don't even need the number in the windows, ]u_t align the
pointers. This is a busy time -setting the CG, MAC, stab etc.
Not worth the trouble - just add a ii and 20 degree detent. No
need for sta_ window. Just line up the pointers. If you go by
the window a_d not the pointers, you'll get a configuration
warning.
PrebaDly no need for it (dial-a-flap) since you have so mucn
engine power.
Why not a 20 degree detent? It's the only T/O setting we use.
Complaints about "opposite rotation" of dials (numbering system
in op_s _e directions). (5)
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Works fine. Not a workload problem. F/O has to lean way over to
set the CG,
Wasn't taught a procedure, so I developed my own -- six steps.
That's too many steps 3ust to set the trim.
_tab and CG poinuers do not line up on the same number. (2)
You need a light to see the green index at night. I use a
flashlight.
It's e_tra workload, i prefer to go at ii degrees (flap) so I
don't h_ve co fool with it.
Pressurization f_
Note: at the time of the first wave interviews there was some
disagreement about the proper way to operate the pressurization
system on the 80. Most of the comments dealt with that question.
To explain briefly, the recommended procedure called for setting
the destination altitude at the gate. An alternative procedure
arose - setting in the cruise altitude by determining (from the
linear scale) thz field altitude setting that would correspond to
the cruise altitude, then setting the destination altitude as
before, on the way down. Interviewees_ particularly F/Os, held
rather strong opinions about the proper procedure.
Standard procedure (never setting cruise altitude) (6)
"Set it on the ground and forget it" (2)
"It's beaut_fully designed"
One captain reported he didn't know there was an alternative
procedure
"Set it at the gate - less workload"
"I've tried both ways - now I just leave it alone"
Alternative procedure (7)
"I set cruise altitude, then set destination.
workload."
It doesn't reduce
Other comments -
Window reads in I00' -- i000' in all other DC-9s
"I set it the way the captain wants it set"
"Easy to make a 'times i0' error - setting 700 for 7000"
6O
Excellent. Very accurate
I set 33,000 instead of cruise FL, esp. if we are going high.
set TDZB instead of FE for landing. At LAS, there's a I00'
difference on R/W 26 and you get a bump (on depressurizat_on).
I
No problem since we fly the other DC-9s too. (2) I hand fly
complex procedures like MUSZL-4 SID (SNA) (See Figure 4}. Easier
for me than to keep checking DFGS. This is what a check pilot
did on my checkout.
Sometimes I fly the F/5 only, though I prefer to fly full
automation. I never fly raw data except on back course. No
concern for proficiency .oss - I j,_st had checkride - thought
about it a lot,, but had no problem.
Some concern. I can already see a loss in skill, but will make
up for it with more hand flying. In IMC I always use A/P and
F/D. In VMC, I'II use F/D only, or even raw data.
Problem is nct just automation in 80, but fewer legs. We a_e
used to I0 legs a day, now in -80 it's four. I should do more
hand flying.
Just had a :heckride in a -I0 simulator -- no problems. Company
wa_:ts you to use autgmation 99% of the time -- no problem for
experience3 DC-9 pilot, but for new pilot it could be.
I have some concern. In VFR I hand fly. In IFR, I fly F/D only
some tlmes. If I'm hand flying and I get ATC call, I'll throw on
the A/P. There would be no problem if i had to take a -30
checkride.
I'm worried, so I hand fly one leg each trip. It hand flies so
nice it's fun to do. I would have no worries about 3umping in a
-30.
K_2dmAd
"slightly less" (8)
"slightly less, but not the 40% less they
"20% less" (3)
(manufacturer) claim"
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=25-30_ less =
=50_ less"
"Considerab,:y less"
"No difference = (3)
Note (2)
Mere mental worXload, but overall less
Overall less due to the _onger legs in the 80, not the equipment.
Overall about the same, but can do more at the gate, and less to
do at _eak times in flight (2_
Less time _o look out to window
If you've armed it, you have to monitor it like crazy. So
there's no real change in workload. Ycu still have to keep
bringing you_ he_d bac_ in the cockpit to be sure it's working.
There's more workload at the gate. It's easier in a -30. It's a
fallacy to think that the gate isn't a busy time. There's
hazardous cargo, call fee alternate, armed persons (law
enforcement personnel), fuel not right. There should be more
emphasis on co_,ano responsibility at the gate.
''m "old school." I speno a lot of time seeing that it
,automation) is doing what it's supposed to do.
Less workload as long as things are ideal
More workload if you're above the glideslopeo ATC doesn't know
you're an 8G, so they turn you too close. Should have a
different designation of an -80 with ATC. *
* Note: this fact was mentioned by several pi)ots, and it was
true at the time. A_C has since changed its procedure
and ca_rles an MD-80 designation on its flight strips.
2_ue
"no difference"
"slightly less"
(2)
(3)
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"far less"
"I'm not used to sitting for three hours"
Less, but probably due to fewer landings
if_u_u could haw one__teee of _4mem_ in_ -80. what
arnold _U_u want ?
Groundspeed readout (4)
HUD
Aural altitude warning (like -50)
PDCS (performance data computer system) (4)
Rearview mirror to see wingtip lights
Direct ARINC link to update weather
Illumination of V-speed card
Pencil holder
ACARS
Nothing (2)
Strobe lights
Would rather standardize our whole DC-9 fleet
Angle of attack indicator
Remove DFGS and put in -50 avionics
Long range navigation system (5)*
* Includes RNAV, Omega or INS. One pilot commented, "it would
have to be cheap - I'm using Center's compute[ right now at no
cost. I can get MSP dlrect Hector (VOR east of Los Angeles)
about half the time."
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_U_V_ TWO /BZ/aX/2aZ
Brand new plane. I like automatic systems.
Pride
Schedule -- I was a bottom block holder.
The long legs
Contemporary plane - I missed it when I went back to the -30.
DFGS can be overwhelming - I just snap it off when things get
complicated.
Too much pitch change in descent, esp. in wind changes.
this I'd go to vertical speed and control with wheel.
Due to
Many electrical glitches that self correct.
If you don't fly the -80 regularly, you get behind the eight ball.
The good points of the 727 are in the -80 (A/T, ABS, alt. alert,
pressurization controls). S/O in Boeing has nothing to do -- I
fought with the F/O just to see who could get the ATIS. In the
-80, you're in the loop all the time.
It's not worth the money (5).
configuration.
Could get by with the -50
Have flown all of Republic's planes.
the top plane.
No comparison. The - 80 is
Totally impressed by the plane. No problems, even out of 5NA.
-80 is a new generation plane. It requizes a new phllosopny of
flying. Differences (with older Dc-gs) are underestlmated --
it's a whole new world. You have to stay in touch with the
plane. The secret is the FMA. Now that we have a simulator, we
should start all over. (Recommends more simulator instruction
with LOFT). There is a dangerous sense of detechment, e.g. auto
G/A. I saw no value in the static airplane training. Would like
a CSS, or at least a "board" you ca_ get your hands on.
At my age DFG$ is a problem. Wish the company hadn't bought i_.
First slx months it was like flying a pinball machine. Computers
64
couldn't take (power) interruption. Use external power at ramp
and things would go black, if you lost external power and
started on APU or battery, you'd lose the computers. Got a F/D
flag on captain's side all the way to PHX, landed and the F/D
came back on. *
Job is becoming too much button pushing.
us when to use it -- should be our choice.
more interesting.
Company shouldn't tell
I want my job to be
On climbout, everything (DFGS) went blank. Switched to other
computer (DFGC) and got nothing. Later it came on.
Older captains have trouble learning DFGS, speed control,
difference between spd/M and A/P pitch to control speed.
Took me 150-200 hours to feel comfortable.
I want it (automation) off.
If anything comes up,
We spend toe much time (looking) in the cockpit. I want one man
looking out, esp. at SNA. Can't De fooling with DFGS in a high
density area.
-80 is a wel) desi@ned machine. If mistakes are made, it should
be in the first i00 nu.rs. Two new people flying together spend
too much time programming. The simulator will be a big help.
I've ridden in back. Good, quiet ride. Passenger comments are
good. Had a highly experienced passenger tell me that business
coach in our -80 is the best ride available.
ATC is changing its mind more and more. It's a bigger problem
in the -80 than the -50...all your programming goes out the
window. So I click it off. If I'm out far enough, I try to
reprogram.
With automation, you bare to stay ahead, esp. G/A and missed
approach.
I love the -80 -- it had gremlins running around in it. At MKE
on a cold morning, no FMA, no A/P. Come on when we warmed up.
Had trouble in cold weather. The -80 compared to a generic is
like _ Cadillac compared to a Model T.
Occasional crossed hands. Captain as PNF (pilot not flying)
setting altitude, while F/O is PF (pilot flying) sets the speed
bug.
Big variation in captair,s' ability to handle automation.
* Corrected in later models of the DFGC.
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)Confusion between heading and altitude when the numbers were the
same (due to digital display).
In automation you're out of the loop.
what is happening.
In hand flying, you know
Programming is simple, once you understand it, but paying
attention to what you have programmed is time-consuming.
_ Ko _ lik_ am_ the _Im_e2
More stable
Quiet cockpit (3)
"Gadgetry"
Radios (esp. twin heads) (ii); individual vol. controls
Ability to program ahead
Digital fuel display (3); "gives you all the information --
much better than the needles"
Backup ADI and altimeter
Radio altimeter design (5); "minimums" voice message
EPR bugs and preprogramming; esp. for power reduction at SNA
Both DMEs on same instrument - "I don't like to look around
cockpit"
Autobrake (7); esp. BUR R/W 07 after rain storm; esp. at SNA
Automation in general (4); esp. in terminal area or step climb
Power and performance (7); esp. 8R out of PHX with full load;
can take off DEN at I00 degrees F with full load; can use
north R/W at PHX.
Quick zeroing of digital fuel display
Self test of slats
No uplatch check (gear)
Digital readouts in general, except when they go black
Test of radar altimeter
Standby airspeed indicator
Color radar
Pressurization
Large F/D
TCI
Test lights
TAS readout
General layout of cockpit
Autothrottle (3); "down to the knot M
Coupled approach
Fuel economy
Ability of F/O to c_uple _/P
Versatility of DFGS -- a£,ility to use some or all (2)
D gital ADF
Back angle select
Vertical speed very accurate
StroDes
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Digital displays (5); "with needles you can catch something out
of whack"
Radar altimeter takes too long to set (3)
Cockpit lighting, esp. on V-speed book (6)
Aural feedthrough on ADF ident and VOR ident
None (so stated)
Too sensitive to engine ice
"Entire logic of DFGS doesn't take wind into account, then over-
corrects. Likewise on glideslope with gear and flap
changes u
Radio altimeter limited to 500 feet; some non-precision
approaches have MDA over 500 (2)
Trouble setting ZFW
Flap-stab-CG computer too complicated
Pressurization -- should use Boeing system to set altitude
Weight and fuel readout - should have separate counters for gross
weight and fuel weight
Crew bags shouldn't rest against circuit breaker panel. Nee_ a
place for bags. A bag can hide a popped circuit breaker.
No place to put pencils. In the generic DC-9s, should stick it
between the glare shiel@ and the side. Nc place in -80.
Leave the DFGS readouts on the panel, but put the control back on
the pedestal
Only time it failed to capture was when we did something wrong
Several mentions of problem of touching pitch wheel killing
altitude capture
F/D too sensitive compared to -50.
F/D approaches
Have to work harder to fly
Too many problems -- failures that can usually be reset by
pulling circuit breakers. Ground school didn't teach us to co_e
DFGS is marvelous ¢_nce you learn to use it. Could fly MSP-LAX
and never touch the airplane (primary controls). Never had
trouble except that which I caused. Can't fly ATC now without an
A/P -- I'm an "autopilot freak"
It tends to pitch up when you engage at 800 feet. If you reduce
vertical speed fast enough, no problem. No problem after
engagement.
Difficult to set i00 foot level in altitude select, e.g. lnltial
approach of 4700' on BUR SID, 3100' on FHX visual. Could
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actually change I000' while trying to set I00'
Altitude arm doesn't always stay in deten_...can fall to adjacent
altitude
In moderate turbulence, A/P shakes off.
turbulence to disconnect it
Takes very little
Autothrottle 2_ {ATE)
Generally favorable comments (4); surprised how accurate it is
at cruise_ use it all the time -- big improvement
Had to learn how to set it on descent
A/T surge is a problem. IAS hold is not always smooth
Great for flying around thunderstorm and holding airspeed.
relief of workload
Big
Didn't realize how good the A/T was till I went back to the -
30...it's excellent on the -80
We don't monitor it enough.
short of takeoff power
I'm concerned that it will clamp
__e_li_ the__ on the _LS?
It "fight's itself" too much on capture.
LOC and not capture
I've had it fly through
Ok in good weather. I hand fly so I don't get spoiled. Fails to
capture LOC maybe 1 in 20 or 30 tries. Only once on glideslope.
I like the preselect -- it makes a smooth pitch maneuver even at
3000 fpm.
Very favorable. Sometimes a new captain would right up the A/P
when the problem was too severe a capture angle (on LOC). Good
glideslope tracking, even if you capture too high
Generally favoraDle...use it 25% of the time. On short approach
you don't have time. Big adjustment in -80 is to get it down in
time
Use it all the time. Gives me more tlme to look out the window.
Airport congestion is the big problem wlth a two-man crew
Captures and tracks very smoothly...better than I can do it. I
use it always, unless I know the ILS is unstable, like at LAS.
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iLs ni unm=  s
Prefer to hand fly with raw data
AL first didn't use automation, but now use it all the time.
Beautiful for approach to PBX
In IMC, ATC sets you up for using it; in visual, you don't have
time
Generally favorable (4)
A few warnings a_e unnecessary, and confusing at first
Toe loud and overwhelmed with warnings (2)
Fire test can be heard by passengers
Ob]ections to "SPEED BRAKE" on touchdown (4)
"SINK RATE" too loud
"MINIMUMS" too loud (2)
Lik_ configuration warnings (3); "tells you exactly what's wrol,g"
:ood safeguard, but too sensitive
Too much talking if there's an emergency, e.g. "ALTITUDE" warning
on ILS when captain's talking. But it's better than beeps and
uones. The lady pinpoints the mode and tells you what the
problem is. You don't have to remember the modes that trigger
it, e.g. parking brake set at takeoff
Likes "OVERSPEED" warning
Dislikes use of woman's voice on CAWS messages
Too much voice warning (3); if it's a real problem, could be a
hindrance, e.g. "minimums" on radar altimeter is a distraction.
PNF and plane are both yelling "minimums"
Should only annunciate abnormal conditions
Likes 210 speed for gear warning
Dislikes 210 kts...should be lower
* See first footnote page 47.
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+,axains
Misses having aural tone on altitude alert (B); you need it more
in -80 than other planes since you rely on automation more;
possible altitude bust at a busy time -- taking ATIS, briefing on
approach plates; should be consistent with other DC-9s
Likes the altitude light (in place of tone)
Too many aural and visual warnings
Blue lights (A/P-l, A/P-2, F/D etc) too inconspicuous
I get warnings due to staying ahead...trying to be more efficient
by staying high longer
Difficult to set altitude alert _" inn,
_j _ • AS you release it, it
changes, esp. when done from captain's seat
Favurable view (6); esp. SNA; top feature -- I use it every time
Note: all comments on autobrake very highly favorable
Loading is critical. If incorrectly loaded, fuel burn goes up.
Had a 2800 pound overburn MSP-PHX
CG computer is Mickey Mouse. Pointers don't line up.
work
H_d to seat flap handle at 20 degree dial-a-flap
They would have done as well to put in a 20 degree fixed detent
It's more
Pressurization f./_O/ -- no comments Wave Two
No problems when I went back and took a proficiency check
a -i0 or -30 simulator (9)
PC in the -30 simulator a little rusty
Best PC (-30 simulator) I've ever flown
7O
(PC) In
Recognized potential problem, but could be offset by hand flying
(2); we get enough experience with non-precision approaches (to
keep proficiency); I always use automation in Dad weather, or at
the end of a long day...otherwise like to do some hand flying
Can lose proficiency if you overuse automation. Happens in the
summer, then come October we feel it. I realized I had become
"soft" when A/P failed and I had to hand fly PHX-ORD
No problem, esp. if you hand fly something like an ADF approach
No problems going back and forth from -80 to generic
Definite scan pattern loss flying the -80, but regained it in one
trip in a generic
Note: the following comments apply to "backward transition" as
occu=red to LAS crews following reassignment to older DC-9s after
a considerable time on the -80. There is not a corresponding
section in the Wave One interviews, since the separate status
did not exist at that time, and most -80 pilots regularly flew
the older DC-_s as well. All pilots that had done backward
transition agreed that it was n_ problem. What little loss of
proficiency (gloss of scan") that may have occurred was quickly
regained when flying the line on the older Dc-gs.
I was spoiled. But the -30 is more fun to fly, a more r_laxed
atmosphere. I don't think I would ever like the -80 more than
the -30, though the workload had become less. The emphasis in
-80 automation is in the wrong place -- guidaace, flying to
altitude, tracking station is not the [roblem
I mlssed the "fancy _tuff". I was on the -80 long enough to learn
to trust it (500 hours). I would have liked reorientation
training in the generic. I went right out on a -10 and flew a
200 and 1/2 approach to minimums. The separate status in the -80
is a good thing. I love electronic toys, and miss the -80
Took a PC instead of a training ride. No trouDle. Nice _o have
the beep (aural altitude alert) again. I missed it on t_e -80.
I relied on automation too much in the -80.
I.ess workload - it does so much for you
Slightly less workload (3); at first more...simulator woul_ nave
helped shorten this period.
Less workload, but not as much <less) as Douglas say_
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No reduction in workload
Took 150 hours to get comfortable, but once you're used to -8G,
the_c is more time to look out
A little less on long legs, but more on sbort legs
All told, more _orkload, but automation smooths the peaks and
valleys
More time with head in the cockpit
No reduction of workload, due to increased monitoring demand
Preprogramming allows you to avoid high workload, e.g. BUR. But
workload can be higher, e.g. ATIS tells you the runway, then you
get a sidestep
Workload is higher for the F/O on the ground -- CG, stab etc.
Not for captain. This is a critical time: checking fuel,
preparing for pushback. (Suggests putting fuel check earlier on
checklist)
Less fatigue In -80 (3); but may be due to easier trips (i)
Note: no comparable section in Wave One.
Favorable view of separate status (5); should have been that
way from the beginning; never should have treated it as 3ust
another DC-9; company tried to "lo_;-key" differences -- we need
continual training on differences
Comments on inadequacy of differences training (4); CSS needed;
"difference class a waste of time -- color slides don't do it";
Training is "much too llght". I had trouble grasping DFGS.
Needed some hands-on experience. Even a CPT would help. Too
much talking about it. Even sitting in the plane would help.
Would like a 60 day proficiency rule in -80 (in place oL 90 days)
Ob3ects to company insistence that automation be used all the
time
15 degree flap on taxi -- not enough time to lower flaps for
takeoff. Have to "lead" it_ esp. at SNA -- R/Ws only I00'
apart, and you get rushed. (2)
I don't think the company uses [he A/B to full advantage; e.u.,
taking off _n heading select -- could take off [n heading hold.
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Would have Deen _asier with simulator.
Vietnam era piluts, are excellent
Our pilots, especially
First 2-4 trips were awkward. The CSS at Douglas didn't work.
A -80 simulator would make a lot of diffe£e_ce, especially with
visual capability.
It takes 2-3 trips to get comfortable, but I lost this when I
didn't fly the -80. I forgot little things.
Ground speed readout (3)
Separate heading bugs (controls) (2)
Mirror to see the wingtip
Long range navigation (2) *
Collisien avoidance system (CAS)
Nothing - don't see the need for a PDCS...we didn't use it in the
Boeing. No need for Omega, given the fact that ATC will
with you on a vector but won't give you Omega direct
* Incl_ides Omega, RNAV, and INS
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VII. DISCUSSION
The ODportunitieR and _ of _
No field study is ever fully nepresentative of the industry.
The airlines are all _ifferent, and the pilots who have
transitioned into the -80 at other airlines differ in many ways
from those at Republic. For example, most of the DC-9-80
operators have transitioned crews from aircraft other than DC-9s:
from 727s at PSA, 737s at Air Cal, and from a variety of aircraft
at two trunk carriers that have obtained the -80, TWA and
American. Thus, other carriers have transitioned flight crews
from Boeing to McDonnell-Douglas products, and in most cases (Air
Cal being one exception) from three-person t_ two-person
cockpits. At the two trunk carriers mentioned, some of the
pilots may have had prior experience with sophisticated flight-
deck automation, for example, junioL captains who had flown as
first officers in 747s, or in DC-10s (AA) or L-1011s (TWA).
Republic probaoly represents the "purest" case -- all of its
DC-9-80 crews came directly from older models of the DC-9 (-i0,
-30, and -50 models). Most were highly experienced DC-9 pilots,
and with the possible exception of military flying, were
encountering modern automatic systems for the first time.
Furthermore, an airline operation is not a pristine
laboratory, far from it, especially in the period following the
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, and the economic hardships that
followed. In the harsh environment of deregulation, high fuel
prices, and high interest rates, this study became "event
driven." As soon as the project began, economic factors made it
necessary for Republic to delay its acquisition of the Super 80s,
taking only three in 1981 and three more in December of 1982.
This impacted the study by making it somewhat difficult to build
_ panel of participants. Many of the roughly i00 Minneapolis
pilots who initially went through the differences school had no
opportunity to fly the -80 after their training, and many who did
flew mixed blocks with a maDority of their time being in older
models. Several of the pilots who originally volur_teered for the
panel never flew the -80, and hence did not fill out question-
naires or participate in the interviews. The Las Vegas panel was
more stable, due to the imposition of the "separate status" rule
in September 1983 (see Page 85, and Page 96, P]ragrap_ 10). Most
of those who bid and were trained for -80 operations tended to
stay with the airplane, until just prior to the closing of the
Las Vegas domicile in August 1984.
At the same time, the overabundance of -_0 qualified _!]ots
in Minneapolis provlded an op[_ortunit? to look into the matter o_f
crews flying both the older models and the automated -80 d_rinu
the same month, even on some pairings the same day. Also, many
of the pilots who qua.[flied in the -80 bid other blocks, an_ t_len
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bid only occasional trip_ in the -80, and many fell out of
qualification (three months) and had to be requalified, to the
concern of management. Again, this offered an opportunity to
gain some insight into the question of skill maintenance in a new
aircraft. So the economic hardships that delayed the delivery of
the aircraft provided both difficulties and opportunities for the
study. Also, for the reasons stated above, this stud_" did not
turn out to be purely longitudinal, but more a mixture of
longitudinal and cross-sectional techniques, since there was some
change of panel membe:s from the first to the second wave,
particularly in Minneapolis.
2.tU 
Line pilots often express the sentiment that their opiniens
and experience are under-represented in the design and
certification of the craft they fly. Most feel that aircraft
manufacturers, in their design work, and the FAA in their
certification: do not make sufficient use of the experience of
line pilots. They further protest that when airline pilot input
is sought, it comes from management pilots, ranking officials of
the flightdeck unions, and others whom they pe=ceive (rightly or
wrongly) as remote from the every day rigors of line flying.
Whether this view is correct or not, or possibly correct but
exaggerated, is not the issue. The sentiment is mentioned here
for two reasons.
First, it is not only appropriate, but necessary to remark
or the motivation of volunteers in any study. It became very
clear in the interviews that the pilot_ volunteered largeJ_
because they felt that participation in the study woulJ allow
them, in some small way, to influence future air t_an_port design
and c_rtifLcation. This feeling was engendered by the invitation
_hich was distributed to the pilots _sk!_ them to join the study,
and by the chairman of the union _afcLy Committee. In his appeal
to the pilots in _upport cf the study, he stated (to paraphrase
as closely as possible), "v_u complain that nobody cares about
your opinions un cockFiC design -- now here is your chance to be
heard."
..,e second reason that pilot oplnion is mentioned is that
a_ide from their :_omplaints that they are under-represented in
design and certification declsions, crews represent a vast and
_aluable "database" of experience tha'_ could be tapped for
evaluating cockpit design. In a short time _fter a new aircraft
i_ introduced, conslderable data are generated, information that
could simply not have been anticipated in the design, testing,
and certification process. In a very real way_ line flying
"shakes down" an airliner and pilot opinion harshly examines the
soundness of the cockpit design. Thus, it is hoped that the data
reported here might lnfluence operational mad t[ainxng decis_<_n_,
certification techniques, future fliahtOeck designs, and
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developmtnt cf principles of automation. Likewise, this study
may be valuable by dismissing some areas thought to be of
concern, where the concern is seen to be unjustified.
However, we must recognize pilot opinions are extremely
variable. This may indeed affect the degree to which studies of
this sort may influence future design and training decisions.
_z_Ltl Xiew of _
For purposes of this discussion, we shall include not only
those equipment items which are unquestionably "automation", that
is those in which previously manual functions were replaced with
devices or elimirarcd (e.g. autobrake), but also those new
features of the aircraft which were designed to reduce workload
or add to the versatility. For example, the dual head
communication receivers are in no way automation, but they do
reducp manual operations by making it unnecessary for the PNF to
_r!he down the new frequencies prior to a frequency change. Also,
changes in instrument design, such as the vertical scale radio
altimeter, and the digital displays, will be discussed in this
report for the same reason. In the mind's eye of the pilots
interviewed, all of these features are intertwined with
automation, and they do not bother with distinctions between
automation and other features of the aircraft.
Overall, a favorable though mildly skeptical bias toward
automation emerges from these data. The mean responses on the
positive items on automation were quite positive (high agreement)
and likewise there was geDerally strong disagreement with the
negatively worJed items. For example, the responses to t_ree
essentially negative items (No. 2, 6 and 19} were mildly
rejected, and those responding to the positive items (No. 8, 9
and I0) showed a mean indicating acceptance. It is interesting
that tnose items that linked automation to economic well-being of
the industry (No. 18 and 20) yielded more negative responses,
with means near mid-range or slightly below. No. 29 which
dealt with the safety implication of excessive automation ("Too
much automation can be dangerous") recelved near-center means,
with wide variaDiiity.
Since much of the inteLview data and responses to open-endeJ
written probes dealt with specific features, as well as pilot
workload, these will be discussed under the workload section.
These results can be summarized broadly by saying that the
ge**eral reaction to the cockpit design was favorable, and was
most favorable to the =automation" related changes. But there
was also consiOerable criticism of specific items that were
perceived as poorly designed, or increasing workload. Also,
as mentioned previously, there was no overall endorsement of tr_e
economic or even the safety impact of automatlon. As for t_e
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economic argument, it must be recalled that the first wave of
questionnaires and interviews occurred late in 1982, when the
economic fortunes of Republic and most other airlines were at an
all-time low. Wave Two occurred in 1983 in Minneapolis, and 1984
in Las Vegas, at a time when the economic situation of the
airline industry was brightening, due to a general upswing in the
economy, a slight drop in fuel prices, and wage and productivity
concessions by the airline unions.
On specific equipmen_ and capabilities, the responses were
again generally favorable toward automation and specific devices,
and toward the Super 80 in particular. There seemed to be high
enthusiasm for the Super 80, as seen in the strong agreements with
the positive statements (No. 31, 33, 35, and 36) and rejection of
the negative statement No. 32. Note that Item No. 31 (mI think
that the -80 is a significant step forward in short and medium
haul aircraft") received the strongest (positive or negative)
mean rating of all of the 36 items. Again, those _tcms that
dealt with the operational limits, and hence economlc factors an_
impact on the company, received a mixed to generally cool
reception (No. 22 and 24).
Further general endorsement of the automation features of
the -80 can be seen from the frequency-of-use data {Table 4-A and
B). The mean frequencies indicate an overall acceptance of the
devices, as well as the company policy that equipment is to be
used where appropriate. For example, the ATS was showed a mean
usage of 98-99% on takeoff, and in transition and enroute climb,
but was used with a mean of only 73-86% of the time in cruise.
This would indicate a wide acceptance of the value of the ATS at
the workload-critical portions of a leg, but some unwillingness
to accept its instabilities at cruise, where the workload is
minimal.
Finally, it is interesting to note the moderately favorable
attitude to_lard and lack of concern for equipment reliability
(No. 25, 26 and 28), especially in view of the fact that the
early model flight guidance and autothrottle computers had some
rather negative characteristics which were corrected in later
models, and several of the interviewees expressed concern over
equipment reliability and the possibility of sudden _nflignt
failures. Several related incidents of what they describeo as
"data dumps" (total shutdowns) of the flight guldance compuuers
after takeoff.
If one could summarize the pilots' attitudes in one sweeping
statement, it would be something like this: "I like the
airplane, I en3oy flying it, I approve of certain features and
not others, I find a moderate reduction in workload, but I
seriously question whether the automation positively contrlbu_es
to safety, and I question whether it is a good investment at the
price."
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Terms such as "workload" and "fatigue" are widely used in
man-machine systems, an_ are poorly defined, difficult to
measure, and impossible to predict. For purposes of this report,
these terms will include whatever the pilots intend them to mean.
If the pilot refers to the number of times he must twist a knob
to set the ZFW as "workload," then it is included here. Mental
workload could include those c_ses where no overt or observable
activity takes place, for example planning where to begin descent
in order to make a crossing restrictions or mentally computing
actual versus planned fuel Durn.
Since workload reduction was at the h,:art of the deslgn and
certification of the -80, as mentioned in =he introduction of
this report, it will be discussed in some detail. Much of what
is repcrced by the pilots in the open-ended probes and the face-
to-face interviews dealt with their perceptions of the workload
question, including broad generalities (as also probed in several
Likert items), as well as discussion of specific systems and
equipment items. This section necessarily overlaps with one
which follows on specific features in the cockpit.
First, the attitude scales (see Table 3-F) make it clear
that the pilots express a positive attitude toward the role o£
automation in workload reduction. The strong positive
endorsement of Items 14, 21, and 27 vouch for this, as well as
the weak rejection of the negatively worded Item 15, 17, and 23.
Overall, Item 27 ("Automation reduces overall workload") tells
the story - a nean of 66 and 70, corresponding to mid-level
agreement. In the Wave Two results, the standard deviation was
lower than usual on this question, indicating less divergence of
opinion. While responses to this item reflect a generally
favorable view of automation as a workload reducer, when asked in
interviews to quantify the degree of reduction, the replies
reflected a perception of modest reductions.
Comments from the check captains also express a favorable
view of workload reduction in the -80, though they, like others,
draw a distinction between the experienced and inexperienced
pilots. Throughout the interviews, pilots expressed the belief
that the first 50 to 100 (some said 150-200) hours on the llne in
the -80 were very difficult, and a considerable amount of time
wa:_ spent trying to understand the automatic systems, monitoring
arid interpreting the FMA messages, and progran_ing the A/P and
A/T, especially in terminal areas. Many said they had their
"heads in the cockpit" far too much during that period, but after
they passed the critical experience level, and became at ease
with the automation, they noticed a reduction in workload, and
more time "out the window." More wlll be sald of the initial
transition oeriod when tralnlng is discussed.
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tAsked to estimate t_e wnrkload reduction on the -80 relative
to older D(:-9s, about 2/3 of the crew members replied Wslightly
less', and the rest were divided between considerably less to no
difference. A few repotted that they felt that the workload was
increased, due to what they perceived as an increases in the
monitoring (nscanning m) demands. And it was generally recognized
that to some extent, the total workload may have been less
reduced than redistributed, with more subtasks to perform at the
gate and fewer in the air, which they recognize as a plus for air
safety_ Several mentioned that mactualm workload had been
reduced, but there was an increase in demand for monitoring, a
point especially emphasized by the check airmen.
These last points are consistent with the views advanced by
Wiener and Curry (1980). A good example is the altitude and
heading preselect functions of the DFGS, which allow the c_ew to
set up for a SID while still at the gate. These, coupled with
the ability of the A/T to control airspeed during climb, clearly
reduce the workload during a critical phase of flight, and one in
which extra-cockpit scanning during VMC conditions is esser_tial.
The favorite example seems to be the MUSEL-4 SID from SNA, with
Thermal transition (Figure 4). This is a complex departure,
coupled with a required noise abatement power reduction at 1000
feet, in an area with high VFR traffic and marginal VMC weather
(ACalifornia VFR'). There can be little doubt that the avionics
and automation of the -$0 make execution of this departure easler
and safer; how much so is impossible to measure.
Other features that_ in the pilots' eye, reduce workload
include the pressurization control, and the A/T system in
general, despite ea_]ier complaints about its instability.
Actually there are probably two classes of workload
reduction_ The first would be those already mentioned, such as
the altitude and heading preselect, and IAS/Mach hold, devices
that can be programmed and will then essentially relieve the
pilot of continuous control, anticipation, and capture maneuvers.
The other category might be called procedure elimination_
devices in which certain procedural steps required in the earlier
models are not required, e.g. the automatic pressurizatlon
control, which eliminates one step, and the dual head
communication receivers, which eliminate writing down
frequencies. A frequently mentioned eliminated step is the
landing gear uplatch che:k. While this was not e_iminated Dy
automation, the pilots do not make this distinctl_n. They vlew
any elimination of steps as workload reduclr_g and view it
favorably, especially when, as in the case of the uplatch check,
the relief comes at a time of perceived heavy workload or
criticality.
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There seems to be little agreement on the subject of
monitoring as a workload item. This is one of the areas where
the check captains appeared to differ (in interviews) with the
line crews. The check captains placed heavy emphasls on
monitoring, especially in keeping a constant check on the FMA
each time an option is selected or a maneuver (such as altitude
capture) is entered. The line pilots appeared to be somewhat
less concerned with monitoring activities, and it is interesting
note that the Likert item No. 17 ("Automation does not reduce
workload, since there is more to keep watch over"} received a
weak mean rejection.
As mentioned previously, most of the crews felt that the -80
brought only a slight workload reduction. This may be in part
due to the fact that there were certain features of the -80
which, in their view, increased workload. In the interviews,
opinions about these pieces of equipment and features took on
great _mportance. Specific features of cockpit equipment will be
discussed shortly, but for now some of the features that are seen
as increasing workload should be mentioned. As in the case of
the perceived workload reducers, some of these are automation
related, some are not. Most frequently mentioned items are the
slat/flap handle which is difficult to seat, especially when
using dial-a-flap options; the necessity to stow the dial-a--flap
after takeoff, which requires considerable manipulation of the
dial; and the setup of the stab setting computer (at the gate),
which is seen as containing unnecessary and even erroneous
information, since th_ two readings cf CG do not exactly agree,
even when the pointers a_e precisely aligned. The contra-
rotating numerical scales (one way for the longitudinal trim
window, the other way for the CG and flap windows) were
frequently mentioned as troublesome.
Certain features are difficult to describe in their workload
impact, since they require management, but eliminate certain
steps, and the net effect is not clear. The best example is the
autobrake, which is well accepted Dy the crews, b,Jt does add
checklist items even when not used. In spite of this, the ABS is
perhaps the single new feature about which the author heard no
complaints, and Table 4 indlcates that it is used on a mean _f
56-63% of the ].andings. Company policy }_rohibited ]t_ use on
takeoffs (for braking in case of re3ected takeoff).
In summary, the perceived workload man_oement of the Su_er
80 is viewed as a modest improvement over tr.e older DC-9s, Ct_t
probably far less than claimed by the m.,ilufacturer.
Finally, the matter of fatlgue was dlscussed with the crews,
but yie]ded little additional information, ._inc.'._ they tended to
see fatigue an_ w,_rkload reduction a._ tr,e .sa_.q. th_ng. LiKert
items No. 27 (overall worklnad reduction) and 30 (overall
fatigue) got simllar mean ratings (06-70), indlcating very
positive acceptanc, _ of [_ositJvely worded probe_, and th_
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intercorrelations between the ratings in both waves were
statistically significant. The oniy new information garnered
regarding fatigue was a secondary effect of the acquisition of
the -80, the fact that longer legs were being flown, the extreme
being MSP-LR_X which is about three hours. Several pilots
commented that they were not accustomed to long flight segments
and found "sitting there for three hours t to be burdensome. Tt
is a further comment on the difficulty of defining, let alone
measuring, fatigue that pilots accustomed to flying rigorous
schedules requiring often eight to ten legs a day, sometimes far
more, in and out of crowded terminal areas, found it fatiguing to
suddenly be flying fewer, longer legs and spending most of the
day at cruise.
Much has been said and written about the potential for
automation to induce an _rosion of manual flying skills, though
the author can find no documented evidence for such a phenomenon.
The dramatic term "automation atrophy" has been applied. The
presumption is that pilots flying highly automatic aircraft will
rely on these devices to the detriment of their flying skills,
and when faced with the loss of automatic equipment, or
transition to a less automatic plane, find themselves unable to
do the job safely, or to conform to their own standards of
performance. Similarly, the term "complacency" arises -- the
presumption being that pilots operating with highly reliable
equipment will become "complacent," probably meaning overly-
trusting, inattentive, and accepting of lower levels of their own
performance. One check captain covenanted. "I'm glad this
equipment doesn't work right all of the time -- if it did,
complacency would be a problem. _
Some of the concern for "automation atrophy" has come from
long-haul carriers, who have noted that senior copilots on
advanced aircraft, who become ready for captaincy and must pass
checkrides in less advanced aircraft, are experiencing
difficulty. The long-haul aspect seems important, since these
pilots have so few opportunities to practice critical maneuvers.
This is in contrast with DC-9-80 operations, which are primarlly
short-haul (e.g. Hawaiian, PSA, and Air Cal), or medium haul
(e.g. Republic east-west routes). The ma3ority of Republic's
trip pairings on the -80 cal] for four legs a day; some call for
two and some three. Thus the typical -80 pilot might fly about
35-40 legs a month, possibly as many as 48. Obeying the custom
of trading legs, each pilot could expect to make in the
neighborhood of 20 takeoffs and landings a month. While this !_
far less than the experience of the typical DC-9 pilot at
Republic, it is probably sufficient exposure to critical
maneuvers to quell some of the fears of automation-induced sk_i[
loss. Nonetheless, some of the concern is based not only c_n a
paucity of critical maneuvers, as in the long-haul carriers, but
on simply over-reliance on automation regardless o_ the numbe: or
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terminal area and other critical operations. For the first two
years of the -80 operations at Republic, the question was
somewhat moot, as all but a handful of very senior captains and
first officers flew mixed blocks. The -80 time was actually a
minority of the flying experience. Thus _he ma3ority of the
pilots had ample opportunity to retain thelr manual skills by
flying traditional DC-9 aircraft.
In September 1983, a contractual change czeated a _separate
status" for -80 crews. Under this change, crews would be
exclusively assigned to the -80 for nine months, and would not be
allowed to bid trips on traditional DC-gs during that period.
Thus the skill loss question might have become more of an
operational reality than it had been during the first two years
of -80 experience.
To the extent that the experimental design permitted
evaluating this question, there has been no indication of a
problem with -80 pilots suffering skill loss. Prior to the
separate stat_s rule, there was little opportunity to examine
skill loss induced by the -80, since nearly all of the pilots
were also flying the traditional DC-9s. Even after the separate
status had been in effect for nearly a year, there was no
indication of an "automation atrophy."
Check captains reported that the six-month proficiency
checks, which up until recently were flown in a -i0 (PHX) and a
-30 (MSP) simulator, were highly professional. Few pilots
expressed any great concern over skill atrophy, as long as they
continued to hand _ly some on every trip, as it was typically
stated. The check captains reported the same thing - they urged
newly transitioned p11ots to keep up their hand flying skills.
The caution was hardly needed in the first i00 or so hours of
flying the -80, as the typical response, reported to the author,
was that when stress was encountered (e.g. unexpected ATC change
in a terminal area; runway change; difficult SID) they would
"click it off." Th_s bears not only on the question of skill
maintenance, but on skill acquisition as well. It is an
interesting commentary that pilots so often reverted back to hand
flying when the unexpected occurred. As one p_lot put it, "I
have never made an automatic go-around before, so when I get a
go-around I'll do it the way I know he_." (The automatic G/A is
now a required maneuver in the -60 simulauor training.)
Much of this difficulty in skill acquisition may have been
Induced by the lack of a -80 simulator, ai_d tnls may nave now
changed since the arrival of Republic's simulator in May 196%.
Furthermore, proficiency checks (PCs) for the -80 pilots are now
flown in the -80 simulator in Atlanta. Soon after the arrival o_
the simulator, c[ew_ showe i some apprehension about flying
dlfficult maned% _s, such as engine outs, In the -b0 on PCs, and
the com?any Jecl_d to allow pilots scheduled for their slx-month
PC to take a _free rlde" the _ay before In order to practlce
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maneuvers. This did much to allay their fears, and in addition
was found by the simulator instructors to be a valuable training
opportunity.
The response to Likert item No. 3 ("I am concerned about a
possible loss of my flying skills with too much automation")
received a mean response near dead-center in both waves, with a
large standard deviation, indicating a wide _ange of responses
from deep concezn to no =oncern.
Concerning ground school methods, many crew members
expressed a disappointment in their differences classes, and a
feeling that they w_nt into their initial operating experience
(fOE) unprepared. Republic's ground school instructors made a
_enuine effort to make the most of the two days in the classroom
to teach the -E0 differences, and had added a "static airplane"
session at night following the classroom periods. The static
airplane consisted of an instructor and two students in the cock-
pit, with electrical power on the airplane, offering instruction
in what they referred to as the "knobology," meaning essential_y
the location and actuation of the controls and switches. As a
training device, the aircraft on the ground is extremely limited,
as most of the crew actions would be non-interactive. The
instructors did the best that could be done with the materials at
hand, but were hampered by the obvious lack of a -80 simulator,
as well as adequate (interactive) classroom training devices.
The flight guidance system and ATS of -80 do not lend
themselves to static classroom training aevices or media, of
which slide/audio lectures are the most common. These are
provided by Douglas for their customers, and may be as well
executed as static training aids can be. But the main
differences of the -80 are not the traditional systems (fuel,
electrical, hydraulic etc.) whlch are suited to slide/audio
presentation quite well, but the dynamics of the DFGS and ATS,
which are not. What seems to be needed is higher quality,
dynamic training devices, both for classroom instruction and
auto-instruction. Microprocessor and high-resolution color
displays are now within a reasonable price range, as well as
interactive video disks, and other digitally based instructional
devices. T_ere appears to be a wide gulf in training devices
between the elaborate high-fidelity (and high-cost) slmul_tor at
one end, and the slide show, paper tralner, and static cl6ssroom
mockups at the other. Clearly there is a need for a [ese6=ch and
development effort directed toward training devices and
technioues to fill t_lis gap.
_4
Attitude questionnaires show surprisingly little concern
over the reliability of the automatic system in the -_0. The
three items (No. 25, 26, 28) dealing with reliability show a weak
mean re3ection of the negative statements, and a weak mean
acceptance of the positive statement (mThe new equipment is more
reliable than the old").
Most of the concern centered around the digital flight
guidance computer, and the A/T system. Most of those interviewed
expressed some concern because they could relate at least one
instance where the systems had failed to perform as expected.
For example, many reported failure to capture a preselected
altitude in climb or descent (the author observed one instance in
a climb), failure to roll out on a preselected heading, or
failure to capture a VOR or LOC beam. There was little comp2ainc
about glideslope tracking on an ILS, except the usual concern
over porpoising, which seems to be an attribute of ground
transmitters more than the on-board equipment.
Problems about aircraft failing to capture or departing from
selected altitudes at level flight are harder to explain. It is
worth noting that the at the time of this writing, the Aviation
Safety Reporting Systems (ASRS) has been receiving numerous
incideDts involving failure to capture altitudes from DC-9-80
crews. T_:2re is a very good chance that the departure was
induced not by equipment failure, but by inadvertent actuation
of the vertical speed knob, or even by a lack of understanding of
its function. Several check captains reported that the trainees
did not understand that once the preselected altitude capture had
been annunciated in the FMA but prior to actual level-off,
movement of the vertical speed wheel would cancel the capture and
initiate vertical movement.
The typical problem was as follows: on a climb or descent
at high vertical speed, altitude capture maneuver could begin and
be annunciated over 1000 feet prior to the target altitude. An
experienced LC-9 pilot, not accustomed to the fast climb and
descent of the -80, would attempt to shallow out the maneuver
after capture, but prior to completion of the pitch correcrlon.
(The flight guidance system does not obey the old rule of t_umb
of no more than 500 feet pe; minute ve[tlc_l speed in the last
1000 feet.) This action would cancel the capture, and tne crew
may not notice the change in FMA annunclatlon. This problem
reflects a lack of understanding of the role of the vertical
* Many of the negatlve comments about the fllght guidance
systen_ were due to conditlons that were corrected by the
manufacturer in later models uf ti_e flight guidance computer.
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speed wheel, the nature of the capture maneuver, and the role of
the FMA messages when initiating a control selection or setup
change. This illustrates only too well the importance of
monitoring the FMA, a concern that appears frequently in
interviews with check captains. Part of the problem may be that
the changes in mode annunciation on tne FMA are silent. Thus,
capture can be cancelled, and very easily missed by the crews.
Some pilots have recommended that an auditory alert be sounded
whenever capture is cancelled. Others =,ave recommended a more
radical design change that would not allow a capture to be
cancelled except by setting a new target altitude. Inadvertent
cance]lation of an altitude capture may be a problem that may
vanish or at least be diminished as a result of increased -80
simulator training.
Much is said about the "unreliability" of _he A/T system.
The problem as described, and as polluted out to the author
repeatedly in the cockpit, is probably not one of reliauility --
the system rarely fazls -- but of prcper setting o_ gains. The
904 computer did much to relieve the instability problems, and
later models such as the 907 and the 920 have resulted in steady
improvements. Although the ATS instability was the target of
much criticism, many pilots reported that the ATS was the feature
of the -80 they liked the most, mainly its aDiiity to contrcl
airspeed in climbout in a crowded terminal area and thus to
relieve the pilots from monitoring airspeed. They seemed wil]ing
to live _ith the instabilities, slnce they could manage throttle
control at cruise simply by allcwing the ATS to set EPR to
establish cruise Mach, and then turr, ing the ATS off. This
use of the equipment is consistent with the Wiener-Curry
principles (Appendix i) regarding designing automation to allow
varieties of pilot options and styles.
f_eaJL_ra_
Interviews and open-ended questionnaire items yielded
valuable pilot opinlon regarding not only automatic devices, but
other cockpzt features. Some of these are covered in great detail
in Table 5, and in Section VI. Especially illuminating are the
responses to the questions on what the pilots like most and least
about the -80, compared to _ [evious models of the DC-9. Let us
examine ]ust a few items, as they bear on the pilots' acceptance
of the aircraft, and their perception of the workload level.
Many of the conu_ents concerned what human factors englnee[z
call control/display ratio, whlch _s the number of unlts (usually
linear or rotational) that a control must be moved per unit
movement of the display. A low C/r) ratio is a "sensltlve _
contro]. If it !s too low, overshoot [ollewed by f'_._-q[azr_
ad]ustment near the target value, result. I[ it is too n'_<;:_,
excess course-g[aln actuation is [e_ui[ed, w_ic_] wa._ the
complaint here. There were frequenn complaints about the C/D
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ratio of the DH setting on the radio altimeter; the complaint
being that it takes too many turns to change the setting from
zero to 200 feet (the most frequent DH). The author tri4 " it out
recently, and found that the C/D ratio was I rev/40 feet
(approximately). On trials performed by the author and a check
pilot, it took about 21 seconds and about 26-28 twists of the
knob to travel the full 500 feet allowable on the minimums
window. This may not be a critical factor, but the pilots find It
a nuisance, and as such contributes in some part to their
perception of workload.
Similar complaints are heard about the ZFW setting, and the
dial-a-flap wheel (especially stowing, as mentioned previously).
One cannot say without some research what the optimal C/D ratio
aight be for these various instruments, nor is it critical to
safety or operations. But the issue should not be dxsmissed as
trivial if pilots are sufficiently annoyed by high C/D ratios to
bring it up repeatedly in this study, and it is t:Je very sort of
small annoyance in the cockpit that leads to the sentiment that
line pilots' opinions are not sought, and could prevent such
design errors. Consistent with this, pilots praised the low C/D
ratio on the CDI needle setting, and the instant response of the
fuel counters to the zeroing button {as contrasted with older
analog gauges, which required that the switch be held until the
needles were driven to zero). Again, one should not infer that
pilots are lazy, but only thmt they prefer sensitive controls
that obtain the desired setting rapidly, especially since
overshoot is not a serious matter in the instruments mentioned
above. High C/D ratios are annoying to the pilot in the same way
that even fractional second delays are annoying to computer
terminal operators. The delays are trivial to system performance,
but loom large in the minds of those who operate the equipment.
The strongest and most frequent complaint about cockpit
design centered around the lighting, and in particular the
necessity to bring up white flood lights to see the V-speed oook
at night. On every night flight the author took, one or both of
the pilots discussed this, and demonstrated the lighting
controls. Most felt that the lighting should have been left
just as it was in the -50. It is difficult to understand why
this did not show up in testing and certification.
Other cockpit featuzes, such as the difficulty in seating
the slat/ flap handle, and problems with inadvertent actuation of
the vertical speed wheel in level flight at altitude select, have
been mentioned. Numerous other complaints and praise can be found
in Section VI.
The final persistent complaint was the fact that the
pushbutton switches on the DFGS control panel do not self-
illuminate when pushed (see Figure 5). It is true that ore can
not tell from looking which button (if any) had been punched, but
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of course that information is available from the FMA (see Figure
6). Generally a pilot would like to have information available
at the source: a self-illuminating button allows a control to be
also a display. On the other hand, one could imagine a design
philosophy behind the non-self-indicating buttons that says that
the FRA is the proper place to receive the information, and
nothing should be allowed to be a substitute for FRA scanning.
The author does not take sides in this. Ic seems _ good
researchable "knobolo<_/" question, and besides, it is not clear
whether the self-illuminating switch was ever considered and
rejected for the philosophical reason stated speculatively above,
or simply was not considered.
In summary, it appears that in the view of the flight crews
participating in this study, the generally excellent cockpit
design of the -80 is marred somewhat by minor design errors which
the crews find annoying. This may be inevitable, since there is
seldom unanimity on design features. For example, the pilots
interviewed were about evenly split on the absence in the -80 of
an aural tone on the altitude alerter. At 750 feet prior _;¢ a
preselected altitude, an amber light illuminates on the
altimeter, and extinguishes at 250 feet prior. Older modei_ _f
the DC-9 have a wide variety of altitude alerting devices _nd a
variety of trigger points, but all include some form of a_:al
warning. About half the pilots said good riddance, the tone was
just one =ore annoyance in the cockpit. The ether half felt that
altitude "busts" were more likely with no aural reminder (except
the CAWS voice warning after a 300 foot excursion). Even the
check captains were divided on this issue, showing, if nothing
else, that even pilots steeped in standardization are not a
monolith. One c_n standardize procedures, but never pilot
opinion. What is still not clear to the author is why 750 feet
was chosen by the designer as the trigger point, in view of the
customary 1000-to-go vocal callout from the PNF to the PF.
Psycho-social
Many authors in the automation world, including _Qiuner and
Curry (1980), have expressed concern (though have offered no
evidence) that pilots in highly automated aircraft may some day
suffer _o,:_e sense of detachment or alienation from the flying
job, e_t_dered by a feeling that the lob has become one of
pushirg outtons and not flying planes. To the knowledge of the
author, the question has never been explored. The attitude
scale items in Tables 2-A and 2-B offer a mixed picture. Scale
Item i ('Flying today is more challenging than ever') received
mild mean agreement (62) in both waves, but a large standard
deviation so apparently there is rather varied opinion on this
matter. Item 6 ('I think they've gone too far with automation R)
got a strong rejection, and Items 9 and i0, [_garding looking
forward to more automation in the future, received mixed
opinions in both waves.
9U
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In the interviews the author detected no psycho-social
symptoms such as job disenchantment, loss of self-esteem, or
sense of detachment. None of the psycho-social items correlated
significantly vlth total time (presumably a reflection of pilot
age). Although there was talk of "being out of the loop", and
references to automation as "Ataris" and "Pac-Man w, this should
be viewed as a minor frustration over adjusting to a new style of
flight, and not a siqn of deep-seated distress. In summary, the
author encountered nothing in this study to warrent concern for
psychological disenchantment with flying as a profession as a
result of the advance of automation.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS
1. The DC-9-80 and its flight guidance system and other
automatic features are generally viewed by the pilots who fly it
as well conceived and well designed. While there are many
features that are questioned and criticized by the crews, overall
they hold the plane in high regard, and view it as a modern
aircraft. Many questioned the economic value of the automation
in the -80, and a few expressed the belief that in view of the
economic conditions in the airline industry, they would have
preferred that the -80 have the improved wing, the -217 engines,
but essentially -50 avionics.
2. Crews generally responded favorably to abstract questions
about flightdeck automation (aircraft type and model
independent), but viewed increasing degrees of automation with
mixtures of approval and apprehension. The dye:all view of
automation was favorable, but many expressed concern about the
pilot beiDg "out of the loop," or "along for the ride." Many of
the crew members, including the most enthusiastic, voiced a
concern over the increasing degree of monitoring ('scanning')
required by automatic equipment. Although pilot age was not a
variable that was directly examined in the study_ the interviews
left the impression of at least a weak relationship between pilot
age and acceptance of automations Some of the senior captains
were the most skeptical of the value and safety of increasing
degrees of flightdeck automation, and the younger first officers
tended to be the most enthusiastic. However, many of the older
captains were strong supporters of increasing automation, and of
the -80 avionics and flight guidance systems in particular. It
is worthy of note that two captains reached mandatory retirement
age (60) during the study, meaning that they had bid the -80 with
only about two years left in their career. Both expressed the
sentiment that they wanted to fly the most modern aircraft that
they could before retirement.
3. There was overall a high usage of the automatic features,
though the data indicated great variations in usage by
individuals. The company policy which the crews call "we bought
it, you use it" was questioned by many. A substantial number of
pilots, particularly captains, felt that the automation should be
provided by the company, but that it should be left to each
individual to determine when and under what conditions he would
choose to use or not use the autematic features. Many of the
younger pilots were strongly supportive of the company policy.
It is difficult to determine whether the less-than-total
conformity to the company policy was based on skepticism about
the automatic features and their reliability and functioning, or
traditional pilots' insistence on their right to choose their own
style of flio_t. Although company policy is outside of the scope
of this report, the author notes that (I) the use of automatic
devices may be more difficult to standardize that other cockpit
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procedures; and (2) the Wiener-Curry principles (See Appendix i)
stress leaving the choice of automation to the pilot. Obviously
this is a difficult question, which will require further line
experience, and examination by researchers and flight managers.
4. During the initial period of this study, there was
considerable concern voiced for the reliability of the automatic
equipment, but by the second wave of data collection, which ended
in August 1984, this concern had dim!ni_hed. This was partly due
to improvements in the equipment itself, for example, by that
time a thi_ generation of f!ignt guidance computer (904) had
been installed, and many of the previous problems had been
eliminated. Also crews' initial apprehension about equipment
reliability had diminished, and many came to realize that what
they had initially viewed as equipment failures were actually
crew errors in operation ef the flight guidance system. By the
end of the study, most crews felt that the equipment was highly
reliable, and expressed only the concern that it required a
degree of monitoring that was beyond what they had been
accustomed to in the earlier DC-gs.
5. On the subject of workload reduction, there were mixed
reviews, as the previous sections reveal. The attitude questions
dealing with workload show an overall positive view, but in
interviews the crews expLessed the opinion that the workload
reduction overall was slight, especially when tmental_
(mcognitivem) workload was taken into account, as well as the
increased demand for monitoring. A consensus was that if one had
to place a number on workload reduction, it would be around 15
per cent, far short of the expectations for the -80.
Specific pieces of equipment and certain procedures were
seen as workload-increasing, for example the stab trim and CG
procedure was viewed by the first officers as high workload
items. Likewise for the operation of the d_ai-a-flap, especlally
in view of the perceived difficulty in seating the flap handle in
the selected detent position, and the need to stow it after
takeoff, which required a considerable number of turns of a
rotary control. Individual features and design parameters were
also c_iticized as workload increasing. Fo_ example, many crews
were critical of the high control-display ratios (lack of
sensitivity) in setting parameters such as the zero fuel weight,
and the minimums on the radio altimeter, both rotary controls.
Som_ of the strongest praise in connection with workload
reduction was directed toward equipment that could net be
described as automation, mostly notably the dual-head com radios.
Nearly all pilots commented on the reduction in workload through
the elimination of the need to write down communications
frequencies.
There was considerable recognition of the fact that although
workload may not have been reduced much overall, it was
redistributed in a manner that allowed certain operations to be
performed at non-critical times (at the gate, for example) rather
than during critical times such as second segment climb. Most
often mentioned was the abi3ity to program for SIDs at the gate,
relieving the pilot of certain steps immediately after takeoff.
Most often mentioned was the MUSEL-4 departure from Santa Aria
(see Figure 4), which was a complex procedure, further complicated
by a mandatory noise abatement power reduction at 1000 feet.
It is important to note once again that human factors
engineers who have studied workload for years have not agreed on
a definition, let alone a measurement, of workload. The author
has side-stepped this question by simply defining workload as
whatever the person doing the work says it is. Thus, while some
of the comments and criticisms voiced by the crew may seem minor
to the outsider _for example the number of turns necessary to set
the radio altimeter minimums), they unquestionably affect the
crews' perception of workload, and should not be ignored. The
pilot who told the author that his workload had been increased
because there was no place to put his pencil in the -80 must be
taken seriously. (He stuck it between the glare shield and the
bulkhead on traditional models.)
6. On the closely related issue of time for extra-cockpit
scanning, pilots were almost unanimous in reporting that the
automation and cockpit configuration of the --80 did not allow any
additional time =to have your head out of the cockpit. = Most
attributed this to the increasing scanning Or monitoring demand
imposed by automation. This is a disappointing, though important
finding, in view of the fact that flightdeck automation has been
sola as a means of allowing crews to spend more time with extra-
cockpit scanning, especially important for short and medium haul
carriers whose crews spend a relatively large amount of their
time in crowded terminal areas. Obviously the designers and
operators will have to address this problem, as the forecast is
for increases in terminal area traffic for the remainder of this
century. If the results of this study are correct, advanced
cockpit technology has not offered any relief.
7. In general, cockpit automation was not viewed, even by its
strongest supporters, as a boon to safety. Their attitude toward
the safety aspect of automation was essentially neutral. Most
crew members viewed positively _he fuel savings and workload
redistribution properties of automation, and many simply praised
the modernity of the -80 compared to earlier DC-9s, and many
described it as a "neat" airplane to fly, but they saw no safety
advantage to the automatic features.
8. This stud_ did not provide a good test of questions _elating
to possible loss of proficiency due to over-reliance on
automation. This was due primarily to the fact, already
described, that during most of the study period, crews _ere
flying mixed blocks of -80 and traditional DC-9 time, so we did
not obtain good data on exclusive or nearly exclusive usage of
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automation. _t is interesting to note that most of the crews
expressed concern over possible loss of proficiency, particularly
prior to Republic's acquisition of the -80 simulator, when they
had to anticipate taking a proficiency check in a -10 or -30
simulator. But none saw this as a serious problem, and each
worked out his own "training program" of hand flying, which was
seen as the means of avoiding any proficiency loss. Each had his
own plan, which he stuck to religiously, almost as if it were a
regulation. The author called these "personal FARs." Almost all
reported that their programs bad prevented any problem, and that
they had encountered no difficulties in t_eir proficiency checks.
The potential for proficiency loss in crews flying highly
automated aircraft has been noted by airlines flying wide-body
aircraft, especially in long overseas flights, and that the
problem cannot be easily dismissed. This question is worthy of
further research, and should be examined further in crews that
are exclusively flying modern, highly automated aircraft. It is
commendable that each crew member developed his "personal FAR,"
but the matter of skills maintenance may be too important to be
left to each crew member's subjective judgement.
During the study, numerous -80 pilots bid back to
traditional models of the DC-9. In Minnea[olis, many had
relatively little time in the -80, for reasons mentioned
previously. But prior to the closing of the Las Vegas base, a
group of -80 pilots with considerable time bid back to
traditional models. All reported that the "backward transition w
was no problem, and that within the first trip they were flying
as well as ever. So_e commented that their experience in the -80
had made them smoothe_ pilots of traditional Dc-gs after their
backward transition.
9. The lack of a simulator during the first year and a half of
operation of the -80 clearly hindered transition and training.
Most crew members reported difficulty during their initial line
experience. The duration reported varied considerably, but most
felt that the first 100-200 hours were difficult. Some reported
durations as little as 50 hours to "be comfortable" with the
flight guidance systems. There was a clear difference between
the Las Vegas crews who had taken their initial training in the
-80 simulator program and the other pilots in the study with
respect to thei_ perception of the time required to feel that
they had mastered the -80.
One problem that was probably underestimated in the -80
t_ansition training was the performance differences between the
models of the DC-9. The higher power, and greater rates of climb
anc 'escent of the -80, had not been taken into account in the
tra _g prior to the -80 simulator. Much of the difficulty that
the _ ;ice -80 pilots encountered in operating the flight
guida_,ce system may have due in part to the higher performance of
the aircraft. Many expressed surprise that they were "behind the
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plane', and this exaggerated their initi._lly awkward management
of the flight guidance system and auto-throttles, and their
feelings of not beii_g _comfortable."
10. The establishment of the "separate status" agreement
unquestionably a_.ded in transition and proficiency acquisition
and maintenance_ It is not within the scope of this study to
comment on l_oor-management agreements, but this case is an
exception, as it so directly addresses a variety of human factors
issues that were central to this study. It was clear from the
co_ents of the Las Vegas pilots, who as a whole w_te the first
tc be impacted by the separate status, that transition was made
considerably smoother by their ability to fly only the -80 during
the initial period of exposure to the new cockpit. This is in
contrast with the Minneapolis pilots, who often went months
before acquiring I00 hours of experience in the -80. This view
was strongly reinforced by the check airmen interviewed by the
author, both in Las Vegas and Minneapolis.
This is not to say that DC-9 pilots, especially those who
were as experienced as those at Republic, cannot safety fly -80s
and traditional models at the same time, but it is clear than
transition time to the "comfortable" level is decreased, and
probably total training time and certainly check airman costs are
reduced by a separate status.
II. During Wave One, prior to the acquisition of the simulator,
classroom training and the use of the static airplane for
t:ansition to the -80 uas generally viewed as inadequate. The
problem probably arises from the lack of proper instructional
devices. The classroom presentations, both at Douglas' training
center in Long Beach and at Republic's differences classes in
Minneapolis relied on audio-visual (slide plus audio tape)
presentation, and a statlc wooden mockup of the -80 flight
guidance control panel. These devices are far from optimal for
traihing for s_ill acquisition in managing a system as dynamic as
the flight guidance system and auto-throttle system of the DC-9-
80. Nor is an elaborate, expensive whole-task simulator the
appropriate tool for initial familiarization and acquisition of
programming skills. What is obviously needed is a family of
dynamic, interactive training devices which are capaDle of
demonstrating to the pilot trainee in real time the dynamics of
the aircraft systems and the consequences of his actions.
Learning to control a new technology cockpit requires a n_w
approach to training. It is inefficient to use an expensive
whole-task simulator for training programming and cognitive
skills. It is ineffective to do it with non-interactive (open-
loop) devices. The time is ripe to develop new, cost-effective
training techniques. The decreasing cost of computer hardware
make such developments feasible, and they can probably be
achieved with presently available off-the-shelf hardware. The
cost and the challenge, however, remain in the a_ea of training
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methods and trainin8 software. It is a signifi_:ant comment on
training that the crews repeatedly told the author that wher_ver
the slightest unexpected event occurred, such as a change of
runway, they would =click it off. =
12. Continuing attention must be _irected toward basi_ human
factors in the design of cockpits. The movement toward :ompuce_-
based, new technology cockpits has made traditional hunlan
factors more important, not less. Programming errors, or what
Wiener and Curry (1980) called "set-up" errors, remain a w_ak
link in system management. Automated flight systems appea_ to
have the discomforting property of tuning out minor errors while
making gross errors more ii_ely (Wiener, 1965). While there i_ a
lively discussion within the systems professions about the
potential for new information technologies such as artificial
intelligence to solve such problems, these techniques are
undeveloped and unproven. _t best, their introduction into the
commercial cockpit may be years away. In the meantime, designers
must pay careful attention _o t_aoitional problems, such as
control design, keyboard entry devices, warning and alerting
systems, and even such seemingly mundane matters as cockpit
lighting. The effective employment of new technology on ti_e
flightdeck still depends to a large extent not on exotica, Dur on
time-honored human factors principles.
13. This study has found no signs of automation-induced psycho-
social problems such as negativity toward the flying as an
occupation, or loss of self-esteem. It would appear that this is
simply not a matter worthy of concern, and until early signs of
such a problem appear in the future, furthe_ research into
psycho-social areas does not appear to be justified. If any
psycho-social effect was detected in the -80 pilots, it was a
sense of pride in having the opportunity to fly a modern
transport aircraft.
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Apper c_ix l
Automation Principles _rom Wiener and Curry _1980)
I. System operation should be easily interpretable or
understandable by the operator, to facilitate the detection of
improper operation and to facilitate the diagncsis of
malfunctions.
2. Design the automatic system to perform the task the way the
user wants it done (consistent with other constraints such as
safety); this may require user control of certain parameters,
such as system gains (see Principle No. 5). Many users of
automated systems find that the systems do not perform the
function in the manner desircd by the operator. For example,
autopiiots, especially older designs, have too much "wing waggle"
for passenger comfort when tracking ground based navigation
stations. Thus, many airline pilots do not use this feature,
even when travelling coast-to-coast on non-stop flights.
3. Design the automation to prevent peak levels of task demand
from becoming excessive (this may vary from operator to
operator). System monitoring is not only a legitimate, but a
necessary activity of the human ope:ator; however, it generally
takes second priority to other, event-driven tasks. Keeping task
demand at reasonable levels will ensure available time for
monitoring.
4. For most complex systems, it is very difficult fo_ the
computer to sense when the task demands on the operator are too
high. Thus the operator must be trained and motivated to use
automation as an addltienal resource (i.e. as a helpe_).
5. Desires and needs for automation will vary with operators,
and with time for any one operator. Allow for different operator
"styles" (choice of automation) when feasible.
6. Ensure that overall system performance will be insensitive
to different options, or styles of operation. FOE example, the
pilot may choose to have the autopilot either fly pilot-selected
headlngs or track ground-based navlgatlon stations.
7. Provide a means for checking the set-up and information input
to automatic systems. Many automatic system failures have been
and will continue to be due to set-_p error, rather than hardware
failures. The automatic system itself can check some of the set--
up, but independent error-checking equipment/procedures should
be provided when appropriate.
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8. Extensive training is required for operators _orking with
automated equipment, not only to ensure proper operation and set-
up_ but to impart a knowledge of correct operation (fo_ anomaly
detection) and malfunction procedures (for diagnosis and
treatment).
a_nilnIAns 2amLs
9. Operators shoul_ be trained, activated, and evaluated to
monitor effectively.
I0. If automation reduces task demands to low levels, provide
meaningful duties to maintain operator involvement and resistance
to distraction. Many others have recommended aoding tasks, but
it is extremely important that any additional duties be
meaningful (not =make-work') and directed toward the primary task
itself.
II. Keep false alarm rates within acceptable limits (recognize
the behavioral _mpact of excessive false alarms).
12. Alarms with more than one mode, or more than cne condition
that can trigger the alarm for a mode, must clearly indicate
which condition is responsible for the alarm display.
13. When response time is not critical, most operators will
attempt to check the validity of the alarm. Provide information
in a proper format for that this validity check can be made
quickly and accurately and not become a source of d.straction.
Also provide the operator with information and controi_ to
diagnose the automatic system and warning system operation. Some
of these should be easy, quick checks of sensors and indicators
(such as the familiar =press to test" for light bulbs); larger
systems may require logic tests.
14. The format of the alarm should indicate the degree of
emergency. Multiple levels of urgency of the same condition n:ly
be beneficial.
15. Devise training techniques and possible training hardwar_;_
(including part- and whole-task simulators) to ensure that
flight-crewe are exposed to all forms of alerts and to many o_ _he
possible cunditior,s of alerts_ and that they understand how t¢
deal with them.
b{
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Appendix 2
Data Management
(This section by Ron Reisman)
It was decided early in this project to do mOSt of the
basic data management tasks on the Apple If+ microcomputer, but
to do the analysis of this data with sophisticated statistical
software (SPSS] on a large mainframe computer (UNIVAC 1100) at
the University of Miami. Thu:_ we had to i) assemble a versatile,
fully supported management information system that would run on
an Apple; and 2) devise a communications system so that the data
could be easily accessed by relevant software package_ on both
micro- and mainframe computers.
DB Master, a commercial data base management program, was
selected as the basis of the Apple's information system. The
data from the questionnaires were entered into two DB Master
files. One file contained the Likert data, the other file
contained the Percent-Use data. Both files contained the
flying time information about the individual pilots, along with
several 'comment' fields for miscellaneous notations. A complete
set of report formats were composed so that all data could be
printed out easily. New report formats can be defined in the
future.
DB Master uses a proprietary disk operating system (DOS)
which is incompatible with the standard Apple disk operating
system. A utility program, DB Master Utility Pak |I, is used to
transfer the data from the DB Master files (which use the
proprietary system) to disks using the standard Apple DOS 3.3.
This utility translates the data from a DB Maste_ format into a
Data Interchange Format (DIF) which can be read by almost 100
other commercially available programs. Data which are stored in
DIF can be sent _o a variety of spread sheet, statistics,
graphics or word processing packages. This provides the Apple-
based management information system with considerable
versatility, since a wide variety of packaged programs can be
used to manipulate the data which was oliginally entered into DB
Master.
In order to use the powerful, mainframe statistical analysis
packages, the data had to be reformatted from the DIF files into
a form more easily read by SPSS. A special program was written
on the Apple which creates SPSS-com[atible Likert and Percent-
Use flles from the DIF files and stores them on _OS 3.3 disks.
These compatible files are then _ransmitted tn the UNIVAC Ii00
over telephone lines, using a moaem (D.C. Hayes Micro-modem II)
and communications software (Visiterm).
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Appendix 3
Glossary of DC-9-80 terms and abbreviations
The following terms apply to the DC-9-80 systems. This glossary
does not include common aviation terms and abbreviatirns. Many
of the terms below are more fully defined in a glossary in the
Republic Airlines' publication DC-9-80 Ei/_ 2/_
ABS - Autobrake System
ALFA Speed - minimum safe maneuvering speed for a given
configuration
ARTS - Automatic Reserve Thrust System
ATS (also A/T) - Autothrottle System
CADC - Central Air Data Computer
CAWS - Central Aural Warning System
CLAMP ("CLMP") - a mode displayed on the FMA when electrical
power is removed from the autothrottle servos
on takeoff roll
Dial-a-Flap - a takeoff flap selector which a11ows the crew
to select other than fixed detent positions
DFGC - Digital Flight Guidance Computer
DFGS - Digital Flight Guidance System
FMA - Flight Mode Annunciator (see Figure 6)
_'ARP - acronym for Thrust-Armed-Roll-Pitch, the four mode windows
in the FMA. The term is sometimes used by pilots to mean
the FMA itself.
TCI - Thrust Computer Indicator (sometimes called TRI - Thrust
Rating Indicator)
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DC-9-80 AUTOMATIC FLIGHT SYSTEMS
The following material is from the Republic Airlines
_ DC-_ Pilet'a _ It is included for the benefit
of the reader who may not be familiar with automatic flight, and
is not intended to be a comprehensive description of the systems.
The airplane is equipped with a flight guidance system (FGS) for
flight guidance throughout the entire flight envelope (takeoff to
landing). Two digital flight guidance computers (DFGC 1 and 27
provide data input for the FGS functions.
The AP function, operating in conjunction with the yaw damper
function, automatically controls the airplane in pitch, roll, and
yaw maneuvering axes. Appropriate control surfaces are actuated
by the AP to control the airplane for the selected mode of
operation.
The AP modes of operation will automatically control the
airplane pitch and roll attitude for the following maneuvers:
maintain an existing altitude; descend or climb to and maintain a
preselected heading, fly to, capture, and track a selected V0R or
localizer course; capture and track a glideslope.
Autothrottle/Speed_j_D_
The autothrottle/speed control functions are available for
operation from takeoff to landing. Aerodynamic sensors, airplane
surface transducers, CADC's, and other sources provide input to
the DFGC's for _pee4 control processing.
Seven thrc.ttle operational modes are available for selection on
the FGCP and thrust rating indicator, or occur automatically.
Selected speed modes are as follows: Indicated airspeed select
(SPD SEL); Mach select (MACH SEL;; and EPR limit for takeoff (TO),
takeoff flexible (TO FLX), go-around (GA}, maximum continuous
thrust (MCT), climb (CL), and cruise (CR).
Appropriate annunciations including numerical values (when
applicable) appear on the FMA (see Figure 6 of this report) to
mrdicate existing operating mode of the autothrottle/speed
control.
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Th_ autothrottle function automatically positions the throttles
to m,,intain airspeed or engin_ thrust as require for the
operational mode selected and airplane control surface
configuration. The autothrottle function will control the
throttles for the following maneuvers: Takeoff, climb, cruise,
holding, approach, flare, and go-around.
The altitude advisory system automatically alerts the Captain and
First Officer that the airplane is approaching the preselected
altitude or that the airplane is deviating from a previously
selected and acquired altitude. An advisory light on each
altimeter provides the alert for either of the above situations.
Am n u a
When set, the automatic brake system (ABS) will automatically
apply brakes during landing and takeoff modes of flight. The ABS
landing mode is armed prior to landing after landing gear is
extended.
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Appendix 5
InteEcorrelation matrices of attitude (Likertscale) data
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